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INTRODUCTION
Limited Maritime Interception Operations have been occurring for
decades under United Nations auspices based on a traditional regime
of flag-state consent.' Today, a new form of Maritime Interception
Operations ("MIOs") is emerging. These new MIOs are designed to
prevent the unique and potentially catastrophic threats posed by
terrorist travel and transport of weapons of mass destruction
("WMD") in the war on terror, and may become a key tool in the war
on terror and in securing the world in the future.2 The United States
Navy received a wake-up call on 9/11. According to one defense
official, "[w]hen we woke up on the 12th of September, the first
thing that we were directed to do by the director of naval intelligence
was make sure what happened with an airplane doesn't happen with
a ship."3
There are some who would argue that these new "Expanded"
MIOs are pushing the envelope of what traditional international and
maritime law would permit a nation-state to do with respect to a
vessel flagged under another state. However, others view these new
1. See discussion infra Part II (providing a historical overview of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions ("UNSCRs") authorizing embargoes and
blockades against various countries, including Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti, and
Yugoslavia).
2. See Vernon Loeb, Fighting Terror on the High Seas; European
Command's Overshadowed-but Key-Role in War, WASH. POST, June 11, 2002,
at A15 (reporting the interception of Syrian-registered merchant vessel, Hajji
Rahmeh, which was one of the first post-September 11 Maritime Interception
Operations ("MIOs") and part of an overall scheme designed to uncover terrorists
on the high-seas); see also News Release, Headquarters United States Central
Command, USS Decatur Captures Possible Al-Qaida Associated Drug-Smuggling
Dhow in Arabian Gulf (Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-872191 .html [hereinafter USS
Decatur Captures Possible Al-Qaida] (describing one Expanded MIO that led to
the capture of a 40-foot dhow in the Arabian Gulf that was smuggling narcotics
linked to Al-Qaida).
3. Loeb, supra note 2, at A15.
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operations as consistent with evolving trends in international and
maritime law.4 For example, the master's authority over his ship (a
key factor in any MIO analysis), once nearly absolute as the only
apparent source of law in a self-contained world, has diminished in
modern times;5 in part due to the increase in communications that
allow ship owners and operators to make decisions in near real time.6
Over the past sixty years, developments in international law have
likewise eroded the role of nation-states under whose flags these
commercial vessels travel.7 Still, it is not clear to what extent this
erosion impacts the time-tested principle of flag-state consent for
searches of vessels flying its flag by other nations. As the world
faces an increase in international terrorism, what is clear, however, is
that seagoing vessels are more at risk than ever of unwittingly
facilitating terrorist travel or the transfer of WMD.
4. See generally Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans:
Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
131 (2005) (critiquing President George W. Bush's proposed Proliferation Security
Initiative ("PSI") and assessing that it is seen as a natural progression of
international law in order to combat the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction ("WMD") on the high seas). The author does acknowledge that some
interdictions could violate international law, but the PSI seeks to amend legal
authorities in order to avoid this potential violation. Id.
5. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823)
(Story, J. on circuit) (noting that vessel masters at sea have "summary, and often
absolute" authority); see also discussion infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the diminution
of ship masters' authority). For a modem day view, although without implications
of the authority to impose brutal punishment, see Karen C. Hildebrandt,
Chartering Cruise Ships for Special Occasions, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 205, 211
(1998) (discussing a relatively recent trend in chartering ships for special
occasions, the author noted that "the ship's master is the ultimate authority over
everyone and everything . . . [I]t is critical that the master be able to veto any
conduct or plan that may jeopardize the safety of the vessel.").
6. See, e.g., Francesco Berlingieri, The Origin and Scope of the Maritime Lien
for Supplies or Repairs in Polish Law: Loginter S.A. v. M/V Nobility, 177 F. Supp.
2d 411, 2002 AMC 283 (D. Md. 2001), 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 405, 406-07 (2002)
(discussing the evolution of international conventions' treatment of maritime liens
and the ultimate abolishment of maritime liens due to advances in communications
technology). Maritime liens were used to obtain credit for ship services and
supplies that shipmasters obtained in the absence of ship owners, but the need for
such liens diminished when communication advances led to ship owners' ability to
respond quicker to shipmasters requests for funds for such services and supplies.
Id.
7. See discussion infra Part L.A (analyzing the ship master's discretion and
authority to control the ship's safety, security, navigation, and commercial dealings
independent of the flag state).
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The primary purpose of this article is to analyze what authority
exists under international law for the United States, or any other
country, to conduct these new MIOs to combat the increased threat to
peace and security posed by international terrorism.8 This article also
presents proposals to augment existing legal authority as necessary to
counter the terrorist threat consistent with international law and
practice. 9
To begin this analysis, it is important to look broadly at traditional
law of the sea principles concerning the boarding of vessels under
the flag of a foreign state. These principles include freedom of
navigation, exceptions to flag-state jurisdiction, and the
jurisprudential limitations upon a master's ability to consent to
searches of his vessel and crewmembers or passengers on board the
vessel.10 The article then chronicles historical precedents for the use
of traditional MIOs under relevant U.N. Security Council
Resolutions ("UNSCRs"), and explores whether, and to what extent,
any of these models provide a legal basis to support an expansion of
such operations to address the emerging needs in the war on terror.
After examining modern MIOs carried out after 9/11, this article then
analyzes recent developments in maritime and international law that
may authorize ship boardings, focusing on the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation ("SUA") and its 2005 Protocol." Next, this article
analyzes U.N. authorities for MIOs, 2 and other similar regimes-
8. See discussion infra Parts V-VI (providing an overview of modem U.N.
authorities and international law enforcement regimes under which MIOs operate).
9. See discussion infra Part VIII (recommending various proposals from
seeking U.N. Security Council authority in the form of a Resolution to conduct
MIOs to seeking an international convention that authorizes nonconsensual
boarding of vessels).
10. See discussion infra Part I.A (deriving principles of navigation freedom and
exceptions to flag-state jurisdiction largely from an analysis of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of Sea).
11. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 3, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered in force Mar. 1,
1992) [hereinafter SUA]; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc.
LEG/CONF. 15/21 (Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter SUA 2005 Protocol].
12. See discussion infra Part V (discussing Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and
several post-September 11 U.N. Security Council Resolutions related to combating
terrorism).
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including counter-narcotics, 13  human smuggling 14  and the
Proliferation Security Initiative -that may lend support to a
discussion of expanding MIOs. Finally, this article concludes with a
summary of legal authorities which support MIOs, and posits ways
to expand such authorities consistent with international law and
practice in order to enhance our efforts in the war on terror.
I. LAW OF THE SEA PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
THE BOARDING OF VESSELS UNDER THE FLAG
OF A FOREIGN STATE
As a general principle of law, a vessel in international waters is
subject only to the jurisdiction of the state under which it is flagged.16
A corollary to this principle, that the flag state's consent is required
for another state to exercise jurisdiction over a vessel found outside
of that state's national waters, has limited exceptions. 7 Most notable
of these is whether the vessel's master has sufficient authority under
international law to permit a MIO in the absence of flag-state
consent. 8 These exceptions are examined below.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.A (discussing counter-narcotics operations and
urging expansion of such efforts to combat terrorism or terrorist related-activities
such as the smuggling of WMD).
14. See discussion infra Part VI.B (discussing U.N. efforts to combat illicit
human smuggling operations through authorized interdictions, while also
suggesting that new and more effective international agreements can be reached).
15. See discussion infra Part VI.C (describing the PSI designed to combat
WMD proliferation through cooperative intelligence gathering and interdictions of
suspected WMD smuggling vessels).
16. By custom and convention, states may board a vessel without the consent
of the flagged vessel within the territorial waters of that state to exercise criminal
jurisdiction if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state, or to
enforce fiscal and customs laws and regulations. See United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Seas arts. 21(h), 27(a), Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-
39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 405,407 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
17. See id. art. 27, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407 (listing limited instances where a
coastal state can exercise its criminal jurisdiction aboard foreign ships that are
passing through its territorial sea).
18. See id. art. 27(c) (authorizing the ship's master or the flag state to
independently consent to a coastal state's boarding and search of the ship).
[22:583
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A. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND EXCEPTIONS TO EXCLUSIVE
FLAG STATE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING MASTER'S CONSENT TO
BOARDINGS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea ("UNCLOS"
or the "Convention"), which the United States regards as the best
reflection of customary international law on navigational freedoms 9
and coastal state jurisdiction, sets forth the principles governing flag-
state jurisdiction on the high seas. In general, the state whose flag a
ship is entitled to fly, and in which it is registered, has legal
jurisdiction over that ship on the high seas.20 Ships, including
warships, which represent states other than the flag state are not
justified in boarding a foreign merchant ship encountered in
international waters2' absent an exception conferred by treaty or
found in customary international law. For example, under customary
international law, as reflected in UNCLOS Article 110, a warship22
has the right to approach any vessel in international waters to verify
its nationality. 3 Additionally, a warship is authorized to stop and
19. See id. art. 87, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432 (stating that "[t]he high seas are open
to all States, whether coastal or land-locked"); id. art. 90, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433
(providing that "[e]very State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail
ships flying its flags on the high seas").
20. See id. arts. 27, 28, 91, 92, 94, 97, 217-18, 220, 226-27, 231, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 407-08, 433-35, 486-89, 491, 493 (providing general principles on
flag-state jurisdiction); see also Steve Raaynakers, Maritime Transportation and
High Seas Governance-Regulation, Risks and the IMO Regime 14 (Paper
presented at the International Workshop on Governance of High Seas Biodiversity
Conservation in Cairns, Australia, June 17-20, 2003), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataonly.asp/data-id%3D8594/RaaymakersHig
hSeasPaper.pf (providing an overview of the concept of "flag State jurisdiction"
and relating the obligations of the flag state to comply with relevant international
laws, including maritime safety and environmental protection laws).
21. While the terms "high seas" and "international waters" are not precisely
interchangeable, the issues analyzed in this paper are unaffected by issues related
to the exclusive economic zone or the coastal zone. Accordingly, no distinction is
intended for purposes of this discussion in the use of either term. See Raaynakers,
supra note 20, at 2 (noting that "international waters" is a common term used to
refer to the "high seas").
22. Article 110 also permits military aircraft or other authorized state ships or
aircraft to carry out this inspection. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 110(4)-(5),
1833 U.N.T.S. at 438-39.This discussion, however, will refer only to warships.
23. See id. art. 110(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438 ("[Tjhe warship may proceed to
verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the
command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the
2007]
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board a foreign flagged-vessel 24 without flag-state consent if there
exists reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in
piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting (and the flag state
of the warship has jurisdiction), or if the vessel is without
nationality. If the vessel is engaged in slavery or piracy, the
boarding party can take action against the vessel and its crew.2 6
In addition, under the principle of belligerent right of visit and
search, a warship can stop and search a foreign-flagged vessel when
it is reasonably suspected of supplying weapons to a third party in an
ongoing armed conflict. 27 Section V will discuss this concept more
fully in connection with the inherent right to self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.28
documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board
the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.").
24. These provisions do not apply where the foreign flag vessel is a warship or
other government vessel. See id. art. 110(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438; id. arts. 95-96,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 435 (providing that warships and ships used for governmental,
non-commercial services "have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any
State other than the flag State").
25. See id. art. 110(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438. One well-publicized boarding
pursuant to UNCLOS Article 110 occurred on December 10, 2002, when two
Spanish warships stopped a vessel with no flag on the high seas approximately 600
miles off the coast of Yemen. See B. Raman, Interception of Yemen-Bound Scud
Missiles, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper563.html.
The Spanish warships were authorized to stop and board the ship to confirm
nationality, pursuant to Article 110. Id. (describing the intercepted vessel to be a
North Korean ship called So San carrying fifteen Scud missiles).
26. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 105, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437 ("On the high
seas, or in any place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a
pirate ship... and arrest persons and seize the property on board.").
27. See DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWP I-14M: THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 7.6-§ 7.6.2 (1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S
NAVAL HANDBOOK] (detailing the procedure for "U.S. warships exercising the
belligerent right of visit and search" and stating that the purpose of the visit and
search is to determine whether the vessel is neutral or an enemy).
28. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (upholding "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations"); see also DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 921-37 (6th ed. 2004) (providing case law on the right to self-defense). The
case of Caroline, which involved the American vessel Caroline that attacked
British ships in Canadian waters and prompted the British to retaliate by sending
the vessel over Niagra Falls, sets forth the "requirements of necessity and
proportionality" in self-defense cases. Id. at 921-22.
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The following sections will discuss the authority of a commercial
vessel's master in the context of both international agreements that
control various aspects of commercial shipping and maritime
industry customs and practices. UNCLOS29 and various IMO
conventions,30 which provide discussions of a master's authority over
his ship in international agreements, impose standards reflecting the
recognition of the professionalism of the ship's officers. Examples of
commercial practices that highlight the master's authority over his
vessel can be found in historical and modern maritime law decisions
from courts throughout the world.31
1. The Master's Authority in UNCLOS
At least two articles of UNCLOS offer an insight into a master's
authority to allow foreign officials on board his vessel in
international waters. While the Convention does not directly address
a master's authority to consent to a foreign warship's boarding,
neither does the Convention purport to be a comprehensive statement
on maritime practices.
Even so, in the context of a coastal state's rights over foreign
flagged vessels in its territorial seas, Article 27 of the Convention
certified that "[c]riminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship" twice
distinguishes the master's discretion in dealing with coastal state
officials from the coastal state's obligation to seek the flag state's
permission.12 An exception to the general rule in Article 27-against
a coastal state's exercise of criminal jurisdiction or its investigation
of a crime committed on board the foreign flagged ship during its
passage through a coastal state's territorial seas-addresses the
authority of the master to request coastal state assistance.33 Article
29. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 27(c), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407 (affording a
shipmaster the authority to request assistance from a coastal state in conducting
criminal investigations aboard).
30. See discussion infra Part I.A.2 (discussing three IMO Conventions that
recognize the shipmaster's authority to make immediate decisions on board).
31. See discussion infra Part I.A.3 (explaining the widespread acceptance of
the shipmaster's authority to make binding decisions when dealing with
commercial matters); see also The Steamship Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1 (1902);
The China, 74 U.S. 53 (1868); United States Coast Guard v. Merchant Mariner's
Document No. Z21756738 1, Decision of Commandant, No. 2098 (Mar. 18, 1977).
32. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 27, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
33. Id. art. 27(1)(c), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
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27(1)(c) would allow coastal state authorities to board a vessel "if the
assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of
the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag
State. '34 The exception in subparagraph (c) is an unequivocal
recognition that both flag-state officials and the ship's master may-
independent of one another-invite coastal state officials aboard to
assist with criminal matters.
A second instance in Article 27 where the master's authority over
his ship comes into play is the triggering of the requirement for the
coastal state to inform flag-state officials of its exercise of
jurisdiction over the investigation of a crime on board the vessel.
Specifically, Article 27(3) of UNCLOS provides:
3.... the coastal State shall, if the master so requests, notify
a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before
taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such
agent or officer and the ship's crew. In cases of emergency
this notification may be communicated while the measures
are being taken.35
Under the terms of Article 27(3), the coastal state has no
requirement to report to the flag state its intended actions on board
unless "the master so requests. '36 A master who believes that an
investigation is warranted is indisputably authorized in his own right
to request a foreign state to board his vessel. Consent granted by the
master to board to conduct such an investigation is yet another
potential ground permitting searches for terrorists at sea. While
UNCLOS Article 27 focuses on criminal jurisdiction within a
nation's territorial seas, and not in international waters,37 the
Convention nonetheless recognizes that the master has a measure of
control over his ship independent from, even if coexistent with, the
flag state.38
34. Id.
35. Id. art. 27(3), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 408 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. See id. art. 27, 86, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407, 432 (distinguishing territorial seas
and the high seas).
38. See id. art. 94(4)(b), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 434 (providing that a flag state must
place each ship in the charge of its master and officers).
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2. The Master's Authority Under the International Maritime
Organization Conventions (IMO)
In the modem era, advances in communications have undermined
the traditional autonomy of the ship's master in controlling his ship.
Whereas ship owners were traditionally forced to entrust a ship's
master with virtually all decisions during the months or years
between calls at homeport, 9 modem communications allow the
ship's owners and operators to make decisions in near real time no
matter where the ship is located. At least one pair of scholars has
credited the role of the ship owners in two famous disasters (the 1978
Amoco Cadiz supertanker grounding and the 1987 capsizing of the
ferry Herald of Free Enterprise) with being at least partially
responsible for the impetus to "reinforce the power of the person on
the spot, who should have the authority to make proper decisions
with regard to safety and environmental protection. '40 Professors
K.X. Li and Jim Mi Ng both view the two incidents as proof that
"decisions by those in . . . [the] office may sometimes be slow,
improper or unsuitable.'
The IMO has recognized that the professional expertise of the
master cannot be replaced through advances in communications that
permit ship owners to be informed of events as they occur and has
explicitly addressed in its regulations the authority of the master to
make decisions on scene.42 The IMO is a specialized agency of the
United Nations which is responsible for implementing and proposing
measures to improve the safety and security of international shipping
39. See Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court's
Subversion of New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 284
(2004) (describing the historic role of a ship's captain at sea as one of almost
absolute autonomy).
40. See K.X. Li & Jim Mi Ng, International Maritime Conventions. Seafarers'
Safety and Human Rights, 33 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 381, 389-90 (2002) (explaining
that advancements in communications technology "has shifted the making of
shipboard decisions, even in emergencies, to the owner's or operator's shore-based
staff.").
41. Id. at 389.
42. See id. at 390 n.49 (noting that the IMO passed a resolution encouraging
states to afford shipmasters discretion and authority to make decisions related to
maritime safety and marine environment protection without being constrained by
ship owners).
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and to prevent marine pollution from ships, 43 including the
development of conventions and involvement in governmental
regulation, legal matters, security issues, and the facilitation of
international maritime traffic.' Notable examples of the IMO
conventions, and their significant revisions, include: the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 45 as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 ("MARPOL 73/78") (pollution
control procedures); 46 the 1995 amendments to the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (training to enhance safe
operations); 47 and the 1995 revision to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
Convention ("SOLAS"), along with codes that have come into force
43. The IMO was established by a Convention adopted under the United
Nations on March 17, 1948, currently has 167 Member States. The Assembly
meets once every two years with the various committees and subcommittees
meeting at least once a year. See International Marine Organization, Frequently
Asked Questions, available at
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic-id=774 (last visited Mar. 14,
2007) [hereinafter IMO FAQ]. The adoption of maritime legislation is still IMO's
most important concern, and since its first meeting in 1959, the IMO has sought to
improve maritime operations through conventions, binding on contracting states,
which impose standards for various aspects of ship operations. Id. To date,
approximately forty conventions and protocols have been adopted by the IMO,
which are routinely amended to ensure they keep up to date with changes in the
world of shipping. See Marine Policy: Shipping and Ports,
http://www.whoi.edu/mpcweb/meetings/Luce presentations/shipping%20and%20
ports.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
44. It is important to remember that the "IMO was established to adopt
legislation. Governments are responsible for implementing it. When a Government
accepts an IMO Convention it agrees to make it part of its own national law and to
enforce it just like any other law. The problem is that some countries lack the
expertise, experience and resources necessary to do this properly. Others perhaps
put enforcement fairly low down their list of priorities." IMO FAQ, supra note 43.
In moving forward with MIOs, it becomes clear that the IMO not only has the
ability to address and "legislate" emerging issues of maritime safety, as it has done
so in the past. However, as noted above, the problem is not one of "legislation"
only, but rather implementation and enforcement.
45. See generally International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, Nov. 2,1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
46. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for Safety of Life
at Sea, Feb. 17, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 5577.
47. 1995 Amendments to the Annex of the Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, July 7, 1995, STATE DEP'T
No. 04-574, 1997 WL 33791187.
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under SOLAS (safety of operations).48 These conventions impose
certification requirements necessary for ships to maintain their
registry under the flag of a contracting state. Failure to obtain proper
certification could lead a flag state to prevent a vessel from getting
underway, or in the case of a coastal state, refusal to allow a ship to
enter port.49 This commercial sanction for noncompliance, with the
attendant costs in lost revenue,50 promotes the effectiveness of the
IMO conventions.
Since 1985, with the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille
Lauro-which will be detailed later in the article-the IMO has
continued to work towards the development and adoption of
conventions and security regulations to address the safety and
security threat posed by acts of terrorism. 51 In at least three instances,
the IMO has directly addressed the authority of the master: the 1995
48. See, e.g., Amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, May 16, 1995, STATE DEP'T No. 97-24, 1997 WL 78231 [1995 Amendment
to SOLAS]; Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea of 1 November 1974, July 1, 1997, 1991 U.N.T.S. 220, ch. V,
Reg. 10, available at
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/amendsolasannex l995.html.
49. See, e.g., William R. Gallagher, President, International Registries, Inc.,
Speech at the Marine Money China Ship Finance Forum: Ship Mortgages as a
Financing Vehicle: The Flag State's Role in Protecting the Security Interests of
Lenders (Oct 15, 2004), available at http://www.register-
iri.com/content/artspeeche/WRG$ChinaOct.cfm (observing that, between July 1
and October 15, 2004, the United States alone expelled, detained, or refused entry
into port, nearly a hundred foreign ships for noncompliance with regulations,
including proper certification requirements).
50. See id. (pointing out the costly nature of regulation noncompliance for
shipowners). Noncompliance with international maritime regulations can result in
large operational costs due to detentions by coastal states. Id.
51. See Chris Trelawny, Maritime Security: Implementation of the ISPS Code
2-3 (Paper presented at 3rd Intermodal Africa 2005 Tanzania Exhibition and
Conference Feb. 3-4, 2005), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/dataid%3D 11698/ChrisTrelawny
.doc (providing that following the 1985 Achille Lauro terrorism incident, the IMO
adopted several resolutions to protect ship passengers and crewmembers, which
ultimately led to the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in 1988). In addition, after
September 11 th, the IMO passed a resolution to review existing international
measures that were created to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against ships. Id.
Subsequently, at a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security in December,
2002, the IMO adopted multiple security-related amendments to the SOLAS. Id.
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Revision to SOLAS, 52 the 1995 International Safety Management
Code (ISM), which entered into force in 1998;53 and Regulation 8 of
the new chapter XI-2 in SOLAS, which enshrines the 2002
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code.54 Each instrument
explicitly recognizes the master as having control over decisions on-
scene.
55
The 1995 SOLAS revision, adding Regulation 10-1, states:
Master's discretion for safe navigation
The master shall not be constrained by the shipowner,
charterer or any other person from taking any decision which,
in the professional judgement of the master, is necessary for
safe navigation, in particular in severe weather and in heavy
seas.
56
Similarly, the ISM Code states:
Master's Responsibility And Authority
The Company should ensure that the safety management
system operating on board the ship contains a clear statement
emphasizing the master's authority. The Company should
establish in the safety management system that the master has
the overriding authority and the responsibility to make
decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and
to request the Company's assistance as may be necessary.57
52. 1995 Annex Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 48, Reg. 10-1.
53. Amendment to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, as Amended, July 1, 1998, STATE DEPT. No. 98-125, 1998 WL
534054.
54. Amendments to the Annex of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, as Amended, Dec. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/amendsolas2002.pdf. [hereinafter
December 2002 Amendment to SOLAS]
55. Id.
56. 1995 Annex Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 48, Reg. 10-1.
57. International Safety Management (ISM) Code, Section 5, Master's
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Most recently, and of most relevance to this discussion, the IMO
adopted "a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of
ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived
threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in
the United States."58 Regulation 8 of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, special
measures to enhance security, confirms the role of the master to
exercise professional judgment over decisions necessary to maintain
the security of the ship, by enshrining the section from the ISPS
entitled "Master's Discretion for Ship Safety and Security," which
provides:
1. The master shall not be constrained by the Company,
the charterer or any other person from taking or executing
any decision which, in the professional judgement of the
master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the
ship. This includes denial of access to persons (except those
identified as duly authorized by a Contracting Government)
or their effects and refusal to load cargo, including containers
or other closed cargo transport units.
2. If, in the professional judgement of the master, a conflict
between any safety and security requirements applicable to
the ship arises during its operations, the master shall give
effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety
of the ship. In such cases, the master may implement
temporary security measures and shall forthwith inform the
Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting
Government in whose port the ship is operating or intends to
enter. Any such temporary security measures under this
regulation shall, to the highest possible degree, be
commensurate with the prevailing security level. When such
cases are identified, the Administration shall ensure that such
Responsibility and Authority,
http://www.imo.org/HumanElement/mainframe.asp?topicid=287 (last visited
Mar. 13, 2007).
58. International Maritime Organization, Frequently Asked Questions on
Maritime Security, http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topicid=897#what
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter ISPS FAQS] (outlining the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code's security measures as well as explaining the
purpose and intent of these measures).
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conflicts are resolved and that the possibility of recurrence is
minimised.5 9
Under Regulation XI-2/8, discretion over access to the vessel-or
at least the authority to deny access-rests with the master.60 Two
points need to be considered in concert with this conclusion. First,
when read in context, access most likely involves access of persons
to a ship in port within a contracting state, rather than in international
waters. Second, the IMO issued a circular in December of 2004
admonishing contracting states for failure to notify flag states and the
IMO when taking control and compliance measures under ISPS. 61
While the circular refers essentially to actions concerning security
levels against ships entering the ports of contracting states, this
explicit requirement for communication with the flag state and the
IMO when taking action appears contrary to the argument that the
master give consent.62 SOLAS and the ISM are consistent with
traditional maritime law in their support for the authority of a master
over his vessel, but provide additional guidance as to how far this
authority extends.63
59. See December 2002 Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 54, Reg. XI-2/8.
60. See id. Reg. 8(1) (denying "any other person" the ability to constrain a
ship's master from making decisions necessary for the ship's safety and security).
61. See Circular, International Maritime Organization, Reminder of the
Obligation to Notify Flag States When Exercising Control and Compliance
Measures (Dec. 14, 2004) (MSC/Cir. 1133), available at
www.imo.org/includes/blastdataonly.asp/data id%3D 10886/1133.pdf.
62. See id. (reminding each contracting government that when it has "taken
control measures or steps against ship[,]" it must "notify flag States when
exercising control and compliance measures").
63. See IMO, IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic id=583&docid=2689#code
(last visited Mar. 13, 2007) [hereinafter IMO Adopts Security Measures]. The ISPS
Code also contemplates three levels of security. Security level 1 is the normal level
at which the ship or port facility normally operates. Security level 2 is a heightened
level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be
maintained for a period of time. Security level 3 is an exceptional level which
applies when there is a probable or imminent risk of a security incident. Further
specific protective measures can be authorized under level 3. Ship and port facility
security is a risk management activity, and as such focuses on the elimination of
the source of the threat. In the context of this paper, this would include eliminating
those who would commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the security of
ships or of the port facilities, which is essentially a government function. In order
to determine what security measures are appropriate, governments must assess the
threat and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act. Notwithstanding the fact
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3. The Master's Authority in Custom, Practice (and Lore) in
Commercial Shipping
Maritime law has long recognized the master's responsibility over
the affairs of his ship.' The master's responsibility for, and authority
over, his vessel has its source in commercial usages and
jurisprudence dating back to the middle ages.65 The safety of the
vessel and its crew is not a responsibility that the master may defer
or delegate, nor is it limited to situations where the vessel is in
immediate danger.66 The master's authority to act is derived from his
duty to keep the vessel out of danger in the first place.67
While the often-brutal discipline, apparently commonplace in the
nineteenth century, 68  has faded, today's masters still retain
that each ship and each port is subject to different threats, the ISPS Code provides
a standardized, consistent framework for managing risks and permitting the
meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between Contracting
governments, companies, port facilities, and ships. In order to communicate the
threat at a port facility or for a ship and to initiate the appropriate response actions
the Contracting government must set the appropriate security level. The security
level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the
implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port
facility. As the potential threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce
vulnerability. The ISPS provides several ways to do so, and each ship and each
port facility will have to determine the measures needed to intensify its security
measures to appropriately offset the threat by reducing its vulnerability.
64. See The Steamship Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902) ("The master of
a ship is the person who is intrusted with the care and management of it, and the
great trust reposed in him by the owners, and the great authority which the law has
vested in him, require on his part and for his own sake, no less than for the interest
of his employers, the utmost fidelity and attention.").
65. See The China, 74 U.S. 53, 68 (1868) (noting that the shipmaster's
authority includes the authority to displace a vessel pilot and recognizing that the
master's broad authority aboard his ship originates from commercial jurisprudence
from the middle ages).
66. See United States Coast Guard v. Merchant Mariner's Document No.
Z217567381, Decision of Commandant, No. 1098 (Mar. 18, 1977) (holding that
the shipmaster is the individual "primarily charged with the care and safety of the
vessel and crew" and that the master must take steps to eliminate any "direct threat
to the master's ability to carry out [such] duty," including conducting searches on
crewmembers for contraband).
67. See id.
68. See Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823)
(Story, J.) (emphasizing the "summary, and often absolute" authority of a vessel
master at sea, the near-impossibility of the passengers' ability to resist the master's
harsh manners with "physical or moral force" and the consequent necessity of legal
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considerable influence in the areas of commercial dealings,
navigation, safety, and security. As one scholar states:
The master is charged with the safety of the ship and cargo;
in his hands are the lives of passengers and crew. His position
demands the exercise of all reasonable care and skill in
navigation, of at least ordinary care and ability in the
transaction of business connected with the ship, and the
constant use of patience and consideration in his dealings
with those under his command or entrusted to his care.69
One Australian scholar, Professor Edgar Gold, has noted that:
The master's legal authority and responsibility ... has been
confirmed by numerous legal decisions in many states over a
long period of time, despite the fact that it has never been set
out in any international instrument. In other words, the
master's authority and responsibility is something that is
accepted in terms of customary law on a global basis.70
restraints against the master should he resort to cruelty against his passengers);
Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857, 863 (D.C.N.Y. 1836) ("A master has no
authority to fall upon a mariner with blows for every inadvertency or act of
misbehavior, unless the urgency to subdue him instantly or to resist some outrage
threatened by him, be palpable."); see also David W. Robertson, Punitive
Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 73, 89, 92-93 (1997)
(discussing punitive damages in various cases awarded to passengers and
crewmembers for the shipmaster's acts of cruelty); COBLESTONES: IRISH AND
SCOTTISH FOLK 30 (Songbook 2004) (referring to the cruelty of shipmasters in
song: "I have sailed with Burgess [the ship's master] once before/And I think I
know him well/If a man is a seaman he can get along/and if not he is sure in hell");
JACK LONDON, THE SEA WOLF (Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc. 1989) (1904)
(referring to the cruelty of sailing ship masters in a fictional account of the brutal
master of the seal hunting schooner Ghost, Wolf Larsen).
69. Edgar Gold, Command: Privilege or Peril? The Shipmaster's Legal Rights
and Responsibilities 7 (Background paper prepared for the 12th International
Command Seminar, London May 21-23, 2003) available at
http://www.ifsma.org/fairtreatment/documents/commandGold.pdf (citing H.
HOLMAN, A HANDY BOOK FOR SHIPOWNERS AND MASTERS 5 (16th ed. 1964)).
Without otherwise clearly stated legal limitations, the master is considered the
legal agent for the ship and is responsible for its safety.
70. Id. at 7; see also Berlingieri, supra note 6, at 406 (noting that it is normal in
admiralty matters for parties to be of different nationalities, and that nations have
put in place agreements to standardize procedures, like procedures related to
maritime liens, since the early part of the last century). For an example of this
standardization see International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
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Professor Gold's position on the universal acceptance of the
master's authority over his vessel is consistent with the view taken in
courts throughout the world on the master's ability to bind the vessel
and vessel owner in commercial matters.71 Maritime law-the subset
of commercial law that has governed relations between merchants,
shippers, ship owners and operators since ancient times-has an
international character that reflects the maritime industry it serves
and the need for a mechanism to ensure the resolution of disputes
arising from sea-borne commerce.72 Some issues frequently litigated
in maritime cases concern the terms and conditions of delivering
goods; 73 others involve the complementary relationship of vessels
with the suppliers of goods and services where the vessel has an
interest in continuing its voyage, and the supplier or service provider
has an interest in ensuring payment by recourse to a lien on the
vessel. 74
The authority of the commercial vessel master away from
homeport to obligate his vessel 75 and the vessel's owner often plays a
Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages art. 2, Apr. 10, 1926, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
28, 38 (Jan. 1933); International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Bills of Lading art. 3(l)(a), Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (the "Hague
Rules").
71. See, e.g., Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932)
(exemplifying a case where the owner of a ferry was held liable for the deaths and
injuries caused by the ferry's master). The master's decision to proceed through
the waters at full-speed caused the ferry to be struck by ice, causing the ferry to
sink. Id. at 507.
72. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 69, at 4 (explaining that UNCLOS provides
coastal states authority to take certain actions when significant maritime accidents
threaten their coastlines and territorial waters with pollution).
73. See O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287, 304 (1897) (asserting that a ship's
owner is civilly liable for delinquencies of the ship's captain); Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 117 (1872) (analyzing historical opinions and asserting that a
ship's owner is liable for losses of the ship and freight due to the shipmaster's
actions).
74. See Silver Star Enters. v. Saramacca MV, 82 F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1996)
(describing maritime liens and explaining that a lienholder may have the owner's
ship be sold in order to obtain payment for the owner's debts).
75. The master can enter contracts resulting in maritime liens, e.g., bottomry: a
debt akin to a ship's mortgage that the master can incur for necessities and ship
repairs on behalf of the ship when away from homeport. See WILLIAM TETLEY &
ROBERT WILKINS, MARITIME LIENS AND CLAIMS, 422-23 (2d ed. 1998). However,
the need for large sums of capital for steel ships rendered bottomry bonds
impractical in the Nineteenth Century. Id. at 473. Similarly, in the case of Yildirim
Gemi Insaat San. AS v. Vakiflar Bankasi TAO, a ship was repaired at sea at the
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central role in maritime law disputes.76 This aspect of the master's
control over the affairs of his vessel is universally recognized, even
though related disputes over whether obligations undertaken were
necessary and to what extent the authority to delegate control could
be extended, are addressed around the world by maritime law
practitioners. While the underlying rationale for delegating to the
master the ability to bind the owner and the owner's ship has far less
force in an era of advanced communications, the master's authority
in the commercial realm remains considerable.77 Today's masters
still retain considerable influence in the areas of commercial
dealings, navigation, safety, and security.78 Commensurate with this
responsibility is the authority to take proactive measures to assure the
safety of the vessel and the voyage.
B. MASTER'S CONSENT TO SEARCHES OF HIS VESSEL
Reading together the historical authorities discussed above on
maritime and international law, and taking into account the IMO
master's request, under the auspices of Article 1235, which allows shipmasters to
execute maritime liens for repair expenses to continue the ship's voyage. Yildirim
Gemi Insaat San. AS v. Vakiflar Bankasi TAO, 11. HD (11 th Civ. Chamber, Ct.
App., Sept. 12, 1999, E. 1998/397, K. 1998/397) (Turkish appellate decision
construing section 1235 of the Maritime Law section of the Turkish Commercial
Code) discussed in Hakan Karan, Turkish Maritime Law Update, 33 J. MAR. L. &
COM, 371, 377 (2002).
76. For example, masters, or those signing on behalf of the master, commonly
bind the ship owner to bills of lading for the carriage of cargo. See Sunrise
Maritime v. Unvisco, (1998) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 287, 293 (Q.B.D.) (calling the
principle "well established" in English case law); Wehner v Dene Steam Shipping,
(1905) 2 K.B. 92 (ruling that a captain as an owner's agent can collect on freight
bills and deduct moneys owed to other charter parties).
77. See Gold, supra note 69, at 8 ("it must be emphasized that these customary
rules were not only developed in the sailing ship era, when communications were
rudimentary, but also that they were principally created in order to assist shipping
as a commercial enterprise"); see also Berlingieri, supra note 6, at 405 (discussing
how the Polish husbanding agent argued that modem advances in communication
technology rendered a narrow interpretation of the authority to bind the ship in
Polish maritime law obsolete since the law originated when the master of the ship
"acted as the only physical presence who could quickly communicate about
services for the ship").
78. See IMO Adopts Security Measures, supra note 63 (setting forth the ISPS
Code's comprehensive measures to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities); see also ISPS FAQS, supra note 58 (providing insight into the purpose
and intent of these security measures).
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developments under 2002 revision to SOLAS Regulation XI-2/8 and
the 2004 addition of SOLAS Regulation 34-1, a strong argument can
be made that the ship's master does have the authority to consent to a
search of his vessel for safety and security reasons, even in the
modem era.
Applying this argument in the context of the war on terror, if a
ship's master is informed that a suspected terrorist or WMD is on
board his vessel, that master could consent to a boarding and search
of the ship by a foreign state for the wanted individual or illegal
cargo if the master believed the search to be necessary for safety and
security reasons of the ship.79 To suggest otherwise would
undermine the ability of the ship master to ensure the safety and
security of his vessel, including in the event of an emergency.
If, instead of a direct threat to the safety of the ship, the master
became aware of a terrorist plot against a third country, or perhaps
specifically against the country seeking to board and search the
vessel, would the master still have the authority to consent? In either
situation, foiling a terrorist plot requires swift and decisive action,
and a flag state might be unreachable, or unable to decide whether to
grant authority to board and search a vessel. While it is clear that
flag-state consent would make the boarding permissible, what effect
would a master's consent have on the legitimacy of the boarding and
search?
There is, however, no direct authority to support the proposition
that a master could consent to a boarding and search of his vessel
without the consent of the flag state in order to thwart a terrorist plot,
capture a terrorist suspect, or search for weapons that do not directly
pose a threat to the safety and security of his ship. s0 Accordingly, in
the absence of specific authority or a well-recognized custom and
practice that would support the proposition that a master's control
over his vessel authorizes decisions not tied to the safety or proper
79. See December 2002 Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 54, Reg. 8-1
(authorizing the master to execute decisions relating to the ship's safety and
security without interference from others).
80. While other grounds may authorize a boarding with or without master's
consent in the latter example, such as belligerent right of visit and search, for the
purposes of this section we are simply exploring the right of the master to consent.
See COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 7.6.1 (describing the
visit and search procedures by belligerent warships of merchant ships).
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management of the vessel, the long-standing principle of flag-state
jurisdiction should prevail." As a result, without the consent of the
flag state, a ship harboring a terrorist who means no harm to the ship,
but does intend harm to a third country, could not be boarded without
additional authority.
C. MASTER'S CONSENT TO THE CAPTURE OF BIOMETRIC DATA
FROM A CREWMEMBER
Again drawing from the historical and legal analysis above on the
master's authority to consent to searches of his vessel, this section
explores whether this right of search extends to crewmembers or
passengers on board the vessel. Specifically, assuming that the
master has properly consented to a boarding of his vessel for the
safety and security of vessel-can the master consent to a search of a
crewmember or passenger if such individual were suspected of being
a terrorist? Following the logic from the previous section, the
master's ability to consent should depend on whether the purpose of
the search is to identify a terrorist that will harm the safety or
security of his ship, or whether it is more broadly to capture a
terrorist who may mean harm to others in the future, and is simply
using the ship as a means of transport. If the search of the individual
is for the purpose of identifying a terrorist that will harm the safety
or security of his ship, then the master should have ability to search
the individual crewmember or passenger. If the crewmember or
passenger, instead, is a suspected terrorist that does not pose a
specific threat to the safety or security of the master's ship, but rather
poses a threat to some other entity in the future, then the master may
not be able to rely on this authority to grant consent and should seek
the approval of the flag state.
For those crewmembers or passengers who do pose a threat to the
safety and security of the ship, it is important to analyze how far the
master's consent to a "search" of the individual goes. Does such a
search permit the taking of biometric data, for example, with the
hopes of identifying the individual through an international terrorist
database? This may be an important aspect of identifying a suspected
terrorist that is traveling with false or no documents.
81. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 92(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433.
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Biometrics is the automated capture of a person's unique
biological data that distinguishes him or her from another
individual.82 Recent technological developments have extended the
collection of biometrics well beyond fingerprints and photographs.
Biometrics can be measured and collected in many forms, including
fingerprints, photographs, voice patterns, eye scans, facial
recognition characteristics, and DNA analysis.8 3 Pushing the above
logic to the extreme, a ship master who has the ultimate
responsibility for the safety and security of his vessel could consent
to an extensive search of the vessel, which may include the collection
of biometric data from crewmembers or individual passengers when
necessary for the safety and security of his vessel. To suggest
otherwise would perhaps limit the authority of the ship's master and
could put the vessel at risk. However, there appears to be little direct
authority that supports this position. In the event that the master's
consent to such a search becomes subject to review in a domestic or
international court, the success of the master's argument will likely
depend upon whether the collection of biometric data from
individuals for the purpose of identifying a potential terrorist was
necessary for the safety and security of his vessel and, therefore,
outweighed any privacy interest held by the individual crewmember
or passenger in the collected data.
More broadly, however, does the individual crewmember or
passenger have a reasonable right to privacy, and therefore have a
right to refuse the collection of their personal biometric data even if
82. Biometrics is the automated capture of a person's unique biological data
that distinguishes him or her from another individual. See Lynn Shotwell, Return
to the Virtual Border: Update from the Department of State and the Department of
Homeland Security, 1566 P.L.I./CORP. 91, 93 (2006).
83. Biometrics is personal information the collection of which may involve
Fourth Amendment privacy issues under a U.S. Constitutional analysis, other
privacy laws under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(art. 17), and other regional human rights treaties, such as the European
Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1992), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (also
known as the European Convention on Human Rights). For the purposes of this
paper, the authors only address the U.S. constitutional analysis, and it will be
assumed that the methods used for collection of biometrics will be minimally
intrusive.
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the ship's master has consented to a search of the vessel, its cargo,
and its occupants? Within U.S. jurisprudence, privacy concerns
raised about biometric data fall generally into two broad categories:
collection and retention.84 When the collection of biometric data is
scrutinized through the lens of the U.S. Constitution, specifically a
Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis, there are no special
protections involved in purely external characteristics.85
Additionally, individuals can be ordered to engage in what is
considered non-testimonial behavior for purposes of identification
when there is a reasonable basis for doing so or other demonstrated
governmental special needs.86 The only limitation is that the
collection of biometric data can not be based upon a lawless
governmental intrusion.87
Assuming a vessel has been lawfully boarded, the collection of
biometric data that does not include bodily invasions-for example,
taking note of eye and hair color, and facial scans-would likely pass
muster under the U.S. Constitution.88 A DNA blood draw, bucaal
swab, eye scans, or even finger-printing might not survive this
constitutional analysis if such tests are viewed as intrusive. However,
as the authors are unaware of direct authority applying this analysis
84. See Brigitte Wirtz, Biometrics Systems 101 and Beyond: An Introduction to
and Evaluation of the Technology and an Overview on Current Issues, SECURE:
SILICON TR. Q. REP., Autumn 2000, at 19, available at http://www.silicon-
trust.com/html-data/pdf/securePDF/securePDF-alle/secure-alle.pdf (claiming
that major privacy concerns include the unauthorized collection, disclosure, access,
and use of biometric data).
85. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (the seminal
U.S. Supreme Court case on Fourth Amendment search and seizure, the Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.").
86. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (recognizing
that many federal and state courts do not offer "protection against compulsion to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements.., for identification").
Recent cases addressing the special needs exception and administrative search
exceptions related to terrorist threats include MacWade v. Kelly, 2005 WL
3338573, at *15-19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) and American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. MBTA, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14345, at *3-6 (D.
Mass July 28, 2004).
87. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (holding that an individual's
fingerprints were illegally obtained by the state because the individual was
transported and detained without probable cause or judicial authorization).
88. See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
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internationally, clear guidelines should be established for the
collection of biometrics in any authorized boarding. It would seem
prudent that any proposed guidelines be consistent with U.S.
constitutional standards and any national legal authority of
participating coalition partners. Additionally, proposed guidelines
should set forth a framework for the retention of biometric data after
it is collected.8 9
II. UNSCRS AS A BASIS FOR BOARDINGS AND
SEARCHES: HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR USE
OF MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS
MIOs in Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia have been
authorized during the last forty years pursuant to UNSCRs.9 ° The
following examples provide insight as to the decision-making
process and the limitations that such MIOs face. One trend this
89. Concerns have been expressed about governmental maintenance of
biometrics data banks. See Wirtz, supra note 84, at 19. These concerns range from
unfocused fears of unnecessary and intrusive governmental oversight to potential
abuse of sensitive information contained in data banks. Unauthorized access, use
or disclosure of biometric identifiers can threaten an individual's privacy interests.
However, if the collection of biometric data is to have any utility, a data bank must
be maintained. Id. at 43. Maintenance of data banks containing personal
information is nothing new for both governmental and private entities and there
already exists a body of law, governmental rules, and regulations controlling the
use of existing systems of records, such as the Privacy Act of 1974 and the
Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2000); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). Review of current
rules and regulations in light of new technologies and operational considerations
may be appropriate. At a minimum, maintenance of any data collected should be in
compliance with existing laws pertaining to governmental records systems. This
may or may not be relevant for the purposes of boarding a vessel as the DNA may
not be "collected" for retention, but rather to match up to an existing profile in a
terrorist database. It may be necessary if such DNA is necessary to link this
particular suspected terrorist to a crime in the United States or through an
extradition request elsewhere.
90. These UNSCRs authorize Member States to take necessary actions to
enforce embargoes upon specified nations. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/221 (Apr. 9, 1966); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966);
S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992);
S.C. Res. 943, U.N. Doc. S/RES/943 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 875, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/875 (Oct. 16, 1993).
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section highlights is that the concepts of embargo and boycott have
ultimately merged into what has become MIOs. 91
A. RHODESIA
In 1966 and 1968, the U.N. Security Council authorized MIOs
against Southern Rhodesia (modem-day Zimbabwe). 92 Rhodesia-
settled under the wing of the British South Africa Company, and
became a self-governing colony in 1923-was moving towards
independence after a federation was established in 1953 between the
two Rhodesias (modem-day Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland
(modem day Malawi).93 In the early 1960s, the situation became
violent. The 1961 Constitution, introduced by Southern Rhodesia,
limited the powers of the United Kingdom, and as the authority of
the British Government began to dwindle, the British Government
tried to push back the Southern Rhodesian rebellion.94 On October
27, 1964, the British Government formally stated that "[t]he only
way Southern Rhodesia can become a sovereign independent State is
by an Act of the British Parliament. 95 This pronunciation supported
the British view that Southern Rhodesia was not a self-governing
territory, and that the United Nations could not interfere with it as it
fell under the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. 96
91. See COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 4.1.1
(discussing provisions of the Charter of the United Nations that allow embargo and
boycott measures and stating that such measures are economic measures used to
influence the conduct of the targeted nations).
92. Authorizing these operations, the United Nations mandated Member States
to prevent Rhodesian imports from entering their territories and also mandated that
Member States implement specified embargoes on Rhodesia. See S.C. Res. 221,
supra note 90; S.C. Res. 232, supra note 90; S.C. Res. 253, supra note 90.
93. See J.E.S. Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BlRT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 103, 103-04 (1968) (discussing British control over Rhodesia in
early twentieth century, which was not based on a strong assertion of power by the
British).
94. See id. at 107 (providing that Southern Rhodesia considered Britain's
remaining powers under the 1961 Constitution as being limited to "'those features
of the Constitution affecting the position of the Sovereign and the Governor' and
to the disallowance of legislation which appears inconsistent with the treaty
obligations of the United Kingdom towards any country or international
organization, or with undertakings in respect of loans under the Colonial Stock
Acts").
95. Id. (citation omitted in original).
96. See id. at 108 (noting that the United Kingdom's assertion that Southern
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Nonetheless, in 1964, the U.N. Committee of "twenty four"
nations adopted a subcommittee report on Rhodesia which attracted
the attention of the Security Council.97 The U.N. Security Council
then adopted a resolution on May 6, 1965, the month that Rhodesian
elections were scheduled, which requested U.N. Member States not
to recognize a declaration of independence by Rhodesia and urged
the establishment of a constitutional conference. 98 In the face of
growing pressure as the year wore on, on November 11, 1965,
Rhodesia's Smith regime declared unilaterally that Rhodesia was
independent.99 In response, two more forceful U.N. Security Council
resolutions were adopted, Resolutions 216 and 217, with the latter
calling upon the United Kingdom to "quell this rebellion ... [and]
take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in
eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end.""1 ' While four
U.N. Security Council resolutions were subsequently adopted, for the
purposes of this article, we will focus only on the economic
embargoes.
In 1966, UNSCR 221 called "upon all States to ensure the
diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying
oil destined for Southern Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira,"
Rhodesia was a self-governing territory for U.N. classification purposes conflicted
with its assertion that the United Nations could not interfere with Southern
Rhodesian affairs). The United Kingdom claimed exclusive jurisdiction over South
Rhodesia. Id.
97. See id. (providing that the Committee of "twenty four" met with U.K.
Ministers of London before preparing its report on Southern Rhodesia).
98. See S.C. Res. 202, 3, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/202 (May 6, 1965); see also,
Fawcett, supra note 93, at 108-09 (describing two additional resolutions that the
General Assembly adopted after Resolution 202 due to the increasing threat of
Southern Rhodesian independence). The first resolution was a stronger version of
Resolution 202, and the second resolution authorized the United Kingdom to use
military force if necessary to prevent Southern Rhodesian independence. Id. at 109.
99. See Fawcett, supra note 93, at 109 (noting that the General Assembly
immediately adopted a resolution condemning Southern Rhodesia's unilateral
declaration of independence).
100. S.C. Res. 217, 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965); see S.C. Res.
216, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/216 (Nov. 12, 1965) (in Resolution 216, the U.N.
Security Council "condemn[ed] the unilateral declaration of independence made
by [the] racist minority in Southern Rhodesia; and ... call[ed] upon all States not
to recognize th[e] illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to
refrain from rendering any assistance to th[e] illegal regime").
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called "upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent, by the use of force if
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empower[ed] the
United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as Joanna V
upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is
discharged there."'10 1 Pursuant to this authority, H.M.S. Berwick
intercepted a tanker, Manuela, on the high seas, and advised the
master of the vessel that the tanker would not be able to continue to
Beira,1°2 in accordance with UNSCR 221.103 The Manuela's master
did not immediately consent to a boarding, so an armed party of
naval officials boarded the ship and stayed until the master agreed to
change his destination. 1° While Article 22 of the Convention on the
High Seas, adopted in 1958 and the predecessor to UNCLOS, limited
the right of a warship at that time to board a merchant ship "[e]xcept
where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,"
the fact that the boarding was carried out as pursuant to a lawful
UNSCR would normally permit a state to carry out an act that would
be illegal absent a Security Council resolution. 105
While this authority seems patently clear on its face, due to a
feeling of uncertainty of authorities laid out in previous UNSCRs,
UNSCR 232, adopted on December 6, 1966, was even clearer. 10 6 It
stated that, "[a]cting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the
United Nations Charter," the U.N. Security Council "[diecides that
all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent" commerce
with Rhodesia, including imports and exports of commodities, the
101. S.C. Res. 221, supra note 90, 4-5 (emphasis added); see Fawcett, supra
note 93, at 118.
102. See Fawcett, supra note 93, at 118.
103. S.C. Res. 221, supra note 90.
104. See Fawcett, supra note 93, at 118.
105. Convention on the High Seas, art. 22, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 92
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962); see Fawcett, supra note 93, at 120-21
(explaining that the Security Council Resolution, authorizing military force, was a
proper exercise of the Security Council's recommendation powers under Article 39
of the U.N. Charter). "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations . . .to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, art. 39.
106. See S.C. Res. 232, supra note 90.
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sale or shipment of arms, and the supply of oil or oil products. 107
Although its language was clearer than that in previous resolutions,
UNSCR 232 still failed to provide a mechanism through which these
actions could be coordinated. 108 Nonetheless, on January 5, 1967,
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed U.S. Executive Order
11,322 Relating to Trade and Other Transactions Involving Southern
Rhodesia, which prohibited imports of key commodities from
Rhodesia into the United States, 109 and virtually mirrored the
remaining U.N. Security Council prohibitions. 110
UNSCR 253, adopted on May 29, 1968, was even more
unequivocal."' It effectuated an embargo on all goods from
Rhodesia, prohibited all financial lending to, or investment in,
Rhodesia, and prohibited the entry of any individuals carrying a
Southern Rhodesian passport into other U.N. Member States."I2
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, [the Resolution:]. . . [d]ecides that . . . all States
Members of the United Nations shall prevent: (a) The import
into their territories of all commodities and products
originating in Southern Rhodesia. . . . (b) Any activities by
their nationals or in their territories which would promote or
are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or
products from Southern Rhodesia .... (c) . . .[T]he carriage
(whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across
their territories of any commodities or products originating in
Southern Rhodesia . . . (d) The sale or supply by their
107. Id.; see also Fawcett, supra note 93, at 121 (observing that the clear
purpose and firm foundation of Resolution 232 distinguish it from previous
resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia).
108. See Fawcett, supra note 93, at 121 (explaining that by neglecting to provide
a mechanism in the form of a committee, to ensure coordination of measures taken,
the Security Council ignored the advice of an Expert Committee that explicitly
recommended such a committee).
109. See Exec. Order No. 11322, 32 Fed. Reg. 119 (Jan. 7, 1967). The Executive
Order prohibited "importation into the United States of asbestos, iron ore, chrome,
pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and
leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after December
16, 1966, or products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere." Id.
110. See S.C. Res. 232, supra note 90, 2 (barring the importation of asbestos,
various metals, sugar, tobacco, meat products, and animal skin products that
originate from Southern Rhodesia).
111. See S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968).
112. See id. 3-5.
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nationals or from their territories of any commodities or
products .... "I
The U.N. Security Council, using its powers in a UNSCR, had
effectively cut Rhodesia off from the world, enforcing a regime of
sanctions through the use of authorized MIOs.
B. IRAQ
Iraq was the first in a series of MIOs carried out by the United
States and other allies in the 1990s. 11 4 Three MIOs were carried out
in different parts of the world, including the Persian Gulf and Red
Sea against Iraq, the Adriatic Sea off of the coast of the former
Yugoslavia, and the Caribbean off of the coast of Haiti.II5
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the U.N.
Security Council, in UNSCR 661, called on Member States to
prevent the import of "all commodities and products originating in
Iraq or Kuwait exported there-from after the date of the present
resolution."'1 6 The resolution also prohibited the transfer of money
and the sale or supply of any commodities or products to Iraq or
Kuwait, other than medical supplies and food if humanitarian
circumstances presented."1 7 Based on a broad interpretation of this
resolution, coupled with a request by Kuwait for assistance and the
inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
the United States began MIOs, and other nations followed.118
113. Id. 1, 3(a)-(d).
114. See generally Richard Zeigler, Ubi Sumus? Quo Vadimus?: Charting the
Course of Maritime Interception Operations, 43 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 26-35 (1996)
(describing a series of three multilateral MIOs, which began in 1990 with the MIO
against Iraq).
115. See id (describing the three MIOs and legal justifications used by various
nations such as the United States for undertaking them). The states involved in the
1990 MIO against Iraq justified the operation under the inherent right of self-
defense and the U.N. Charter's authority. See id. at 31.
116. S.C. Res. 661, 3(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); see also Jane
Gilliland Dalton, The Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, 41 NAVAL L. REV. 27, 30 (1993) (noting that the resolution preceding
Resolution 661, unlike the latter, only condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and
did not require members to take action).
117. See S.C. Res. 661, supra note 116, 3(b)-(c).
118. See Zeigler, supra note 114, at 28 (providing that Resolution 661 did not
specify whether unilateral or multilateral MIOs were permissible under its auspices
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A Multinational Interception Force, designed to enforce these
U.N. sanctions, was established.'1 9 Cuba, among other countries, did
not interpret the UNSCR so broadly, and urged the U.N. Security
Council to condemn these "unilateral enforcement" actions.12 0 The
U.N. Secretary General of the time, Perez de Cuellar, supported this
concern, stating that "only the United Nations, through its Security
Council Resolutions, can really decide about a blockade.''
Accordingly, on November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council
authorized U.N. "Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully
implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990). " 122 "All necessary means" is explicit U.N.
Security Council authority for a MID, and at a minimum, could be
viewed as an endorsement of the regime of MIOs that was
underway. 123
The purpose of the MIO was to prevent the Iraqi government from
selling and earning a profit from contraband oil in violation of the
UNSCRs. 1'24 If a ship had to be boarded, every effort was made not to
cause undue hardship to the ship or its crew. 125 To demonstrate
compliance with the embargo, the ship had to have its entire contents
and that the United States interpreted Resolution 661 broadly by acting
unilaterally).
119. See Lois E. FIELDING, MARITIME INTERCEPTION AND U.N. SANCTIONS:
RESOLVING ISSUES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE HAITI CRISIS 368, xxii (1997) (providing that the
Multinational Interception Force included over "forty-five U.S. ships and 15,000
U.S. personnel and more than thirty ships from foreign forces"). Twenty of the
Multinational Interception Force ships were designated to be used exclusively for
MIOs. Id.
120. Zeigler, supra note 114, at 28 (noting that Cuba was the most outspoken
and adamant nation to condemn unilateral enforcement actions).
121. Id.
122. S.C. Res. 678, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
123. See id.
124. See Peter Sinton, The Smuggler Sleuths Lab 'Fingerprints' Oil to Enforce
Iraq Embargo, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 21, 1996, at DI (describing the
process by which a U.S. Customs Service lab in San Francisco detected oil
originating from Iraq). This lab played a critical role in preventing Iraq from
smuggling contraband oil from its shores. Id.
125. See Dalton, supra note 116, at 56 (noting that, if a boarding and search took
several hours, the crew was usually permitted to observe their mealtimes and
engage in prayer).
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accessible along with complete paperwork, otherwise the ship would
be diverted for further inspection. 126 The U.S. Coast Guard played a
large role in the MIO, due to its experience with boardings related to
drug and contraband smuggling in and about the territorial waters of
the United States. 127
When Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, following the
January 15 deadline set forth in UNSCR 678, additional authority to
conduct MIOs emerged.128 All parties, including Iraqis, were
belligerents. Under the law of war, "[e]nemy merchant vessels . . .
may be captured at sea whenever located beyond neutral territory.
Prior exercise of visit and search is not required ... [w]hen military
circumstances preclude ... adjudication as an enemy prize, [and the
vessel] may be destroyed after all possible measures are taken to
provide for the safety of passengers and crew. "129
The smuggling of Iraqi oil began in the early 1990s. Although
smugglers initially used tankers and larger cargo ships, they later
changed to smaller ships, thirty to forty meter "dhows, '13 to make it
more difficult for the Maritime Interception Force. The use of dhows
was effective and temporarily resulted in fewer interceptions.'31 The
126. See id. (stating that ships were diverted if there was even the slightest bit of
discrepancy in their paperwork or the smallest portion of their cargo was
unavailable for inspection).
127. See id. (explaining that the U.S. Coast Guard's seasoned performance in
maritime interdictions owed largely to their knowledge of commercial shipping
documents and likely hiding places for contrabands on merchant vessels).
128. See id. at 68-69 (describing significant changes that were made in the
status of Iraqi merchant vessels' after Desert Storm began, which made it more
precarious for such vessels to be out at sea). However, the MIO had few
encounters with Iraqi merchant vessels during Dessert Storm. Id. at 70.
129. Id. at 69; see COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 8.2.2
(describing the capture procedures of enemy merchant vessels and civilian
aircraft).
130. See Michael R. Gordon, Threats and Responses: With Allies Likely and
Unlikely, US. Navy Stems Flow of Iraqi Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A2
(providing that smugglers in large vessels employed various tactics to impede
detection of Iraqi oil by searchers, including hiding oil under piles of hay or
cement floors). Despite their size, dhows can individually hold up to several
hundred metric tons of oil. Id.
131. See Howard Schneider, Review of Iraq Sanctions Reflects 'State of
Disarray'; U.S. Seeks Response to Erosion of Restrictions, WASH. POST, Mar 3,
2001, at A 14 (noting that, after smugglers began using dhows, which tend to travel
within national territorial waters, it became "too difficult for the current
enforcement system to monitor such ships while also trying to keep larger, oil
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MIO continued throughout the 1990s until the beginning of the Iraq
War in 2003.132 During that time period, the Maritime Interception
Force made over forty thousand queries of ships, boarded
approximately seventeen and a half thousand ships, and diverted
approximately two thousand ships from entering Iraq. 133 Even as late
as 2003, in the first week of the year alone, the Maritime Interception
Force made 113 queries of ships, boarded sixty-three ships, and
diverted nineteen ships.134
C. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
In response to increasing ethnic strife in the region, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 757 of 1992 laid out prohibitions on the sale or
supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia and
Montenegro respectively, of all commodities or products that were
not medical supplies or foodstuffs. 3 5 U.N. Security Council
Resolution 943 reaffirmed this embargo, stating that all restrictions
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the aircraft embargo, the ferry
service, and participation of sporting goods and cultural exchanges,
"shall be suspended" for a time period until after the Secretary
General issues a report that the authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia are "implementing their decision to close the border
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with
respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing
for essential humanitarian needs."' 36 The Resolution further required
the Secretary General to submit reports every thirty days on whether
bearing vessels from leaving the country").
132. See Christopher Munsey, Gulf Boarding Operations: Steady Work, Risky
Business, NAVY TIMES, May 10, 2004, at 15 (stating that the MIO mission changed
in 2003 with the inception of the Iraq war, whereby coalition forces of Operation
Iraqi Freedom now focused on maritime security for Iraq).
133. See id. (listing figures reflecting MIO interception efforts in 2002, whereby
MIO ships stopped five thousand vessels, boarded 2,920 vessels, and diverted 890
vessels for additional inspections).
134. See id.
135. See S.C. Res. 757, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992).
136. S.C. Res. 943, 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/943 (Sept. 23, 1994).
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the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had effectively
closed the border. 137
D. HAITI
In 1993, Haiti was led by a brutal military dictatorship headed by
Raoul Cedras, after the democratically elected President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide was forced into exile. 1 8 Haiti's military and police
authorities cracked down severely on Haitian citizens, arresting and
killing them, and destroying their property. 139 In UNSCR 841 of
1993, the United Nations "[d]ecide[d] to prohibit any and all traffic
from entering the territory or territorial sea of Haiti carrying
petroleum or petroleum products, or arms and related material of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and
equipment. . . .,,40 The United States and members of the
international community, pursuant to UNSCR 867 (establishing the
U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)), officially began military action
against Haiti in 1993.141 This operation became known as "Operation
Restore Democracy.' 14z The military authorities of Haiti obstructed
137. See id.
138. See Kenneth Freed, Cedras Resigns in Haiti, Ending Brutal Regime;
Caribbean: Military Leader, Chief of Staff Quit Under U.S. Pressure. Move Clears
Way for Return ofAristide, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1994, at Al (declaring the end of
a "three year[] . . . brutal and corrupt military dictatorship" under Lt. Gen. Raoul
Cedras, which commenced when the army drove Aristide from office). Aristide
was Haiti's first democratically elected president. Id.
139. See Mike Doming, Under Aristide, Haiti's Judicial System Remains
Corrupt,; 'Justice' Slow, Sometimes Administered by Oppressors, CHI. TRIBUNE,
Feb. 26, 1995, at 13 (reporting that Cedras' allies are believed to have killed over
3,000 people and to have beaten, raped, or robbed even more individuals); see also
President William J. Clinton, Letter to Congress on Deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces to Haiti 4 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 766 (Nov. 1, 1993) (describing
actions by Haiti military as "lawless, brutal actions" that undermine the Haitian
people's "manifest desire for democracy").
140. S.C. Res. 841, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (Jun. 16, 1993).
141. See S.C. Res. 867, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sep. 23, 1993) (approving
the establishment and dispatch of the U.N. Mission in Haiti for six months, subject
to possible extension).
142. See Clinton, supra note 139 (indicating that, as part of Operation Restore
Democracy, the United States deployed U.S. Navy ships to conduct interception
operations); see also S.C. Res. 873, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (Oct. 13, 1993)
(deciding to effectuate the measures listed in Resolution 841, such as the oil
embargo, unless the parties to the Govemors Island Agreement implement the
agreement to reinstate President Aristide); S.C. Res. 841, supra note 140, 16
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the UNMIH, which was acting under U.S. command and control,
together with allied nations and in cooperation with the legitimate
government of Haiti.'43
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 875 on October 16,
1993, which called upon Member States "to use such measures
commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary.
to ensure strict implementation of' the Haiti embargo on
petroleum and arms and related material imposed by U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 841 and 873, "and in particular to halt inward
maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify their
cargoes and destinations."'" As a result of Resolution 875, U.S.
naval forces began a MIO on October 18, 1993, to ensure
compliance with the embargo on Haiti, 145 and more broadly, as part
of the U.S. and international efforts to restore democracy in Haiti and
to promote democracy in the region.1
46
During the time of these MIOs, the U.S. Navy conducted
enforcement operations around Haiti both within and outside of its
territorial sea. 147 The initial MIO included six U.S. Navy ships and
support elements from the U.S. Atlantic Command. 48 Subsequent
MIOs were comprised of up to six U.S. Navy ships in the approaches
to the Haitian ports, and the Maritime Interception Force also
(expressing "readiness" to assess restrictions "with a view of lifting them" if the
"de facto" Haitian authorities sign and implement in good faith, an agreement to
reinstate President Aristide).
143. See President William J. Clinton, A Further Report on the Status of the U.S.
Contribution to the Ongoing United Nations Embargo Enforcement Effort of Haiti,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-241, at 1 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No. 103-241]
(reporting that in response to Haitian military authorities' ongoing obstruction of
UNMIH dispatch, the Security Council adopted Resolution 875).
144. S.C. Res. 875, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (Jun. 16, 1993) (emphasis added).
See Clinton, supra note 139 (characterizing the enforcement regime under
Resolution 875 as meant to "ensure strict implementation of' Resolutions 841 and
873).
145. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-241, supra note 143, at 1 (noting that U.S. Navy
Forces serve at stations near Haitian ports).
146. See Clinton, supra note 139, at 766 (referring to Operation Restore
Democracy as a measure consistent with American policy of supporting
democracy in Haiti).
147. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-241, supra note 143, at 1.
148. See Clinton, supra note 139, at 766 (stating that among other tasks, the U.S.
Navy ships were deployed to monitor merchant ships entering Haiti shores so that
they comply with U.N. embargoes against Haiti).
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consisted of navy and support elements from Argentina, Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.'49 The purpose of
the MIOs was to ensure that any merchant vessel traveling to Haiti
was in compliance with the sanctions and embargo. 150 By April,
1994, more than 6,000 vessels had been stopped, more than 700 had
been boarded, and approximately 44 had been diverted to other non-
Haitian ports for further inspection.' 5' By July 1994, however, it was
clear that sanctions alone were inadequate to restore democracy to
Haiti. As a result, the U.N. Security Council issued UNSCR 940,
which authorized the "use [of] all necessary means" to ensure a
departure of the military leadership and the restoration of Aristide to
power in Haiti. 152 In response, the U.S. military deployed to Haiti to
remove Cedras and restore Aristide to power.153
UNSCR 944, adopted September 29, 1994, called for the
termination of "measures regarding Haiti set out in" UNSCRs 841,
873, and 917 "at 0001 a.m. EST on the day after the return to Haiti of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide."'154 Aristide returned to power in
October 1994, and there was a peaceful resolution of the crisis.155
The U.N. Security Council, in UNSCR 944 of 1994, ended the
military action and the sanctions against Haiti. 1 6 It is believed that
the MIO in Haiti was effective in preventing the sale of embargoed
items, and did put pressure on the Cedras government which
ultimately resulted in Cedras stepping down. 57
149. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-241, supra note 143, at 1.
150. See id.
151. See id. (noting that that these operations successfully deterred use of
tankers for oil shipments).
152. S.C. Res. 940, T 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
153. See Zeigler, supra note 114, at 35 (providing that the United States
spearheaded coalition efforts to reinstate President Aristide).
154. S.C. Res. 944, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/944 (Sept. 29, 1994).
155. See Zeigler, supra note 114, at 35 (detailing the rise and fall of Cedras, as
well as the return of Aristide).
156. See S.C. Res. 944, supra note 154, T 4 (repealing the measures adopted
against Haiti in UNSCRs 841, 873, and 917); see also S.C. Res. 841, supra note
140, 5-8 (mandating among other restrictions, that states stop supplying
military equipment and oil to Haiti); S.C. Res. 873, supra note 142, 1 (deciding
to reinstate the sanctions of UNSCR 841); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917
(May 6, 1994) (placing restrictions on Haiti in order to implement the Governors
Island Agreement and restore political stability in Haiti).
157. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-241, supra note 143, at 1; Zeigler, supra note 114,
at 35.
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As evident from the preceding sections related to Iraq, the former
Yugoslavia, and Haiti, all of the MIOs were multinational,'58 and all
were conducted in accordance with a UNSCR. While, historically,
customary international law or other parts of the law of neutrality
served as authority for blockades, modern multinational MIOs are a
post-World War II creation, relying upon the U.N. Charter for
authority, and UNSCRs for specific authorization. 15 9 Analyzing these
operations, it is clear that a specific UNSCR authorizing MIOs
against terrorists or weapons used by terrorists in connection with a
particular conflict or more generally is consistent with international
law and precedent. Likewise, language authorizing "all necessary
means" in a particular conflict or more generally to combat
terrorism, would also support the use of MIOs. We will explore, in
the next three sections, MIOs that were not clearly and specifically
authorized by a UNSCR. These include Leadership Interception
Operations in Afghanistan, arising from Operation Enduring
Freedom, the Israeli Karine-A Incident occurring in 2002, and more
generally, the War on Terror.
III. MODERN MARITIME INTERCEPTION
OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the United States began what has come to
be known as a "Global War on Terror," or simply the "War on
Terror," against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates. 160 After
9/11, as part of the global war on terrorism, it has been alleged that
modern MIOs have been conducted in key areas to deter, deny, and
158. See Zeigler, supra note 114, at 2 (characterizing the MIOs in the named
regions as "multinational," but explaining that the MIOs were actually "national in
practice" because nations followed their own protocols when carrying out the
operations). Each nation implemented its own practices for "command and control,
rules of engagement, and communications" procedures. See id.
159. See id. at 19 (stating that the distinction between authority from customary
international law and authority from the U.N. Charter is important because in the
latter situation, MIO forms are controlled largely by Security Council resolutions).
160. See Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is 'War On
Terror', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at AOl (reporting President Bush's affirmation
that the conflict with the Islamic extremists responsible for the September 11 th
attacks is a "war" against people that implement terrorism to satisfy their
objectives).
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disrupt the movement of terrorists and terrorist-related materials.1 6'
This section explores the open source and anecdotal reports in the
press of these modem MIOs designed to intercept either terrorists or
weapons at sea.
A. LEADERSHIP INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
On September 12, 2001, the U.N. Security Council condemned the
attacks of 9/11 against New York, Washington, D.C., and
Pennsylvania, as a "threat to international peace and security.1 62 At
the same time, the U.N. Security Council recognized "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter." '163 In early November, 2001, the United States engaged in
armed conflict against Afghanistan, which had harbored Usama Bin
Laden, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates, in Operations
Enduring Freedom ("OEF"). The U.N. Security Council endorsed
this action, and further condemned "the Taliban for allowing
Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the
Al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe
haven to Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and others associated with
them."' In UNSCR 1386, adopted December 20, 2001, the U.N.
Security Council established the International Security Assistance
Force ("ISAF") to help maintain security in Afghanistan1 65 at a time
when U.S. military forces were taking strong and decisive action
against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates.
During OEF, Leadership Interdiction Operations ("LIOs") were
conducted by coalition forces to cut off the escape of Al-Qaeda
members fleeing Afghanistan.166 LIOs continued under Operation
161. See Pakistan Contributes to Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan, STATES
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 29, 2004, at 1 (discussing the critical role of Pakistani Navy
ships in implementing MIOs in the region). Pakistani Navy ships also provide
regional expertise to other state's ships patrolling the region. Id.
162. S.C. Res. 1368, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
163. Id.
164. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
165. See S.C. Res. 1386, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (giving the
ISAF authority for a period of six months to work with the Afghan Interim
Authority to maintain security near the Kabul region).
166. See G. K. Herring, The War in Afghanistan: A Strategic Analysis, in
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 161, 170 (Williamson
Murray ed., 2003) (noting that leadership interdiction operations in the North
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Iraqi Freedom to again stop terrorists from escaping. 67 Coalition
forces, including Canada, Poland, France, and other states,
participated in these LIOs. 168 LIOs, while a subspecies of MIOs, pose
additional challenges because of the small vessels, such as dhows,
upon which a fleeing terrorist could potentially hide. 169 This
increases the number of vessels that must be contacted and
potentially searched.
B. ISRAELI NAVY KARINE-A INCIDENT
The Karine-A incident is an example of a successful modem MIO
carried out by a country other than the United States. On January 3,
2002, Israeli Defense Force commandos intercepted and seized a
Palestinian-owned ship in international waters, known as the Karine-
A, which was smuggling weapons from Iran to the Gaza shore by the
Red Sea. 7' Tonga was later reported on Lloyd's List, which tracks
worldwide shipping records, to be the flag state of this vessel, but the
vessel was owned by a Yemen-based Iraqi.' Israel claimed that the
Arabian Sea specifically targeted Al-Qaeda members attempting to escape to
Somalia and Yemen).
167. See 'This Was a Different Kind of War': Interview with Vice Admiral
Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy, PROCEEDINGS, June 2003 (pointing out that during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, several states continued their Enduring Freedom
Operation efforts through the use of LIOs in the North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman,
and the Red Sea to catch terrorists).
168. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM FACT SHEET (June 14, 2002),
http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm (listing international contributions
to the war on terror, including LIOs carried out by Canadian Naval Forces and
Polish Special Operations Forces); EMBASSY OF FRANCE IN THE U.S., FRENCH
MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (May 17, 2002),
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2002/sfia/fightl.asp (describing the
French contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, which included French
warships conducting LIOs in the Arabian Sea).
169. See Leadership Inderdiction Operations, CNA QUARTERLY, June 2002, at
2, available at https://www.uscol.hq.navy.mil/can/images/02jun.pdf (explaining
that contrary to the less significant problem dhows pose in MIOs, which are
primarily used to interdict vessels smuggling oil or weapons or engaging in piracy
or slave trade, dhows increase sea traffic and can be used to hide one or few
escaping terrorists).
170. See David Ivry, Arafat's Credibility Washed Up, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2002, at A 15 (noting that the weaponry found aboard Karen A included 2.2 tons of
high-grade explosives).
171. See David Osler, Tonga Freezes Register After Karine A Backlash,
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Karine-A was carrying fifty tons of weapons with Arafat's personal
knowledge.'72 According to then U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell, it was "a pretty big smoking gun," and "clear from all the
information available to [the United States] that the Palestinian
Authority was involved." '73 The weapons cache reportedly included
Katyusha rockets, anti-tank missiles, land mines, mortar shells,
sniper rifles, and high-grade explosives,174 and were packed in
waterproof plastic and attached to buoys which would allow them to
be dropped off or retrieved at sea. 75
Some refute the claims that Arafat knew about the weapons on the
Karine-A, and have argued that it was more likely that Israel wanted
to convince authorities in the United States that the Palestinian
Authority and Iran are also enemies in the War on Terror.'76 Arafat
stated that the Israeli's had "made-up" the story, and that this
LLOYD'S LIST, Jan. 15, 2002, at 1 (reporting that the Tongan government released
a statement expressing its shock over the Karen A incident and its intentions to
launch an investigation into the incident). Following the Karen A incident, new
registrations for Tongan ships were temporarily suspended. Id.
172. See Chris Talbot, Israel Steps Up Assault on Palestinian Authority, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Jan. 22, 2002,
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/isr-j22prn.shtml (reporting on Ariel
Sharon's belief that Arafat coordinated the Karen A shipment to gain military
advantage over Israel during the ceasefire in effect at the time of the incident);
Kenneth Jacobson, ADL Analysis: Arafat Knew About Weapons Shipment, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE WEBSITE, http://www.adl.org/israellkarine-a.asp (last
visited Mar. 14, 2007) (suggesting that the highly coordinated and well-financed
nature of the arms shipment confirms Arafat's involvement in the Karen A incident
and exposes the "true face of Palestinian terror").
173. Interview by Jim Lehrer with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_0l/alia/a2012809.htm. Although Secretary
Powell believed that Palestinian leadership was involved in the incident, he stated
that he could not link the incident directly to Palestinian leader Arafat. Id.
174. See Ivry, supra note 170, at A15.
175. See Jacobson, supra note 172 (explaining that Karen A crewmembers were
instructed to package the weapons in watertight containers to enable boat couriers
to retrieve them from the waters of the Mediterranean Sea).
176. See Talbot, supra note 172 (relating that some view the Karen A incident as
a set-up by Israel undertaken to have a justification for increasing its security
operations); The Karine-A Provides Sharon with a Pretext, MIDEAST MIRROR, Jan.
7, 2002 (reporting that Arab press and commentators dismissed the Karen-A
incident as a contrived conflict orchestrated by Israel to spawn anti-terrorism anger
against Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria). Some view the incident also as a way
to undermine American peace envoy efforts in that region. Id.
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operation was too sophisticated for the Palestinian Authority.'77 The
Palestinian Authority issued a statement that it did not have
knowledge of this arms shipment, and that such an act was not
consistent with its policy. 78 However, Omar Akawi, the captain of
the ship (a Palestinian naval officer and member of Fatah for twenty-
five years), publicly admitted that the Palestinian Authority had
directed his mission.1 9 This undermines the Palestinian Authority's
denial of the incident, as does the fact that such an intricately
planned mission could not have been carried out without the
knowledge and financial backing of the Palestinian Authority. 80
Akawi, along with three others arrested on the ship, were charged
with illegal arms trafficking in an Israeli military court.'8 ' At the
same time as the Karine-A Incident was underway, the United States,
through its intelligence services, was also tracking the same vessel'82
as part of its broader efforts to protect against the growing threat of
international terrorism.
C. WAR ON TERROR MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN AFGHANISTAN
What are the parameters of these modem MIOs? According to the
State Department in 2002, a modern MIO mission "involves the
boarding and search or inspection of suspect vessels and taking
custody of vessels that are carrying out activities in support of
terrorist organizations."' 83 In the Navy's 2007 fiscal year budget
request to Congress, the Navy characterizes its role in MIOs as
follows:
177. See Jacobson, supra note 172 (stating that there is mounting evidence
implicating Arafat in the Karen-A incident which undermine Arafat's position that
Israel contrived the incident).
178. See Ivry, supra note 170, at A 15.
179. See id. (providing that Akawi's primary contact was Palestine's chief
armaments procurer, who also purchased the Karen-A ship).
180. See id. (stating that the "director of finances for Arafat's general security
forces, and . . . deputy commander of the Palestinian naval police" were
significantly involved in the Karen-A incident).
181. See Israeli Radio Says Retaliation for "Arms Smuggling" to Last Several
Days (BBC radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2002) (indicating that Sharon ordered the PNA
to arrest the parties involved in the illegal arms trafficking).
182. See Jacobson, supra note 172 (stating that the United States tracked Karine-
A from Yemen to Iran, and then to Palestine).
183. Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing (June 3, 2002).
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Because more than 95% of the world's commerce moves by
sea, it is likely that terrorist networks utilize merchant
shipping to move cargo and passengers .... U.S. naval forces
are well trained to carry out the MIO/EMIO mission ... to
deter, delay, and disrupt the movement of terrorists and
terrorist-related materials at sea.184
The term "Expanded Maritime Interception Operations" ("EMIO")
is often used to describe these new operations. EMIO, the Global
War on Terror's maritime component, applies globally. 85 The Navy
only intercepts a ship and sends boarding teams aboard when it has
gathered sufficient information to determine the vessel is acting
"suspiciously.' 1 86 Generally, if there is a strong Navy presence, in the
form of a destroyer with helicopters overhead, most masters will
consent to a search. 187 When masters do not consent, there are Navy
SEALs on board with the capability of using force. 188
In 2002, the U.S. Navy acknowledged it was providing training to
service members for compliant and noncompliant boardings of
vessels 189 that could be engaged in terrorist activities. In January,
2002, the USS LA SALLE (AGF 3) assisted in the interception of
the Hajji Rahmed, a Syrian-registered merchant vessel, which was
boarded and searched pursuant to a MIO designed to uncover
terrorists in the high seas. 190 Neither terrorists nor contraband was
found on the vessel, and the Syrians protested, alleging that the
boarding was an act of piracy.191 As of June 11, 2002, after seven
different ship boardings, no contraband had been seized, and no
suspected Al-Qaeda members had been arrested; however,
intelligence officers believed that they had gained a valuable
184. RHUMB LINES, Oct. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.navyleague.org/councils/rhumblines102704.doc.
185. See id. For the purposes of this article, we will not distinguish between
EMIOs and MIOs.
186. See Loeb, supra note 2 (reporting that surveillance teams spend weeks
collecting information about a vessel's owners, crew, cargo, and ports before
officials make the decision to board and search the ship).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See CNN Live on Location: Interview with Capt. George Gaylo (CNN
television broadcast Dec. 11, 2002).
190. See Loeb, supra note 2.
191. See id.
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appreciation of smuggling and similar criminal enterprises which
could support terrorist activities. 19 2
On December 15, 2003, however, a U.S. Navy boarding team
from the destroyer USS DECATUR (DDG 73) intercepted a 40 foot
dhow in the Arabian Gulf using these expanded MIOs designed to
deny use of the seas by terrorists and smugglers. 193 On board the
vessel, large quantities of narcotics were seized and three of the
twelve crew members were captured as having suspected links to Al-
Qaida. 194 In reporting on this incident, RADM Jim Stavridis,
Commander of Enterprise Aircraft Carrier Strike Group stated,
"[t]his capture is indicative of the need for continuing maritime
patrol of the Gulf in order to stop the movement of terrorists, drugs
and weapons .... This is a vital part of winning the global war on
terror."'195
The U.S. Navy has continued to develop its MIOs program and
work with coalition partners and other allies to advance joint MIO
exercises. 196 As an example, Pakistan Navy ships have been working
with the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet to carry out MIOs in their region
starting in April, 2004.'1 Likewise, the USS THE SULLIVANS
(DDG 68) began work with Albanian, Croatian, and Macedonian
Forces in the Adriatic Sea to conduct exercises in MIOs in October,
2004.198 During the same month, the USS HOPPER (DDG 70), in
192. See id.
193. See USS Decatur Captures Possible AI-Qaida, supra note 2 (clarifying that
the dhow was traveling in a smuggling route known to be used by Al-Qaeda).
194. See id. (stating that about two tons of narcotics worth approximately eight
to ten million dollars were found on the dhow). The boarding team initially grew
suspicious of the dhow because it lacked proper documentation, and an initial
investigation revealed a clear connection between Al-Qaida and the drug
smuggling operation. Id.
195. Id.
196. See News Release, Headquarters United States Naval Forces Central
Command, Navy Ships Return Fire on Suspected Pirates (March 18, 2006),
available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/Release%20pages/Releases/043-
06.htm.
197. See Pakistan Contributes to Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan, supra
note 161 (explaining that as a part of the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan
executed by the Commander Task Force 150, the Pakistan Navy Ship Babur
conducted operations with the USS The Sullivans and French frigate FS Surcouf in
the Gulf of Oman, where terrorism threatens the oil and shipping industries).
198. See USS The Sullivans Participates in Adriatic Multilateral Exercise,
NAVY NEWSSTAND, Oct. 26, 2004, available at
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Masawa, Eritrea, was engaged in a display of Visit, Board, Search,
and Seizure gear used for Maritime Interception Operations to
Eritrean military personnel. 199 While much of this reporting is
anecdotal in the media, there has not been a clear policy statement
arguing the case for these modem MIOs in the War on Terror, and
laying out the parameters of such a program.
D. PIRATES IN SOMALIA
As the twenty-first century unfolds the world is again confronted
with piracy. No longer the romanticized hoop earring-wearing
swashbucklers traveling the high seas in masted schooners, today's
pirates are often found in dhows trolling off the coast of one of the
world's most lawless countries, Somalia. 00 The cutlasses of centuries
past have been replaced by automatic weapons and rocket propelled
grenades ("RPGs"), and recent events have shown that Somali
pirates are unafraid to use them. 0 Though pirate attacks and
hijackings off the coast of Somalia are relatively common, there has
been a marked increase in the number of incidences over the last
eighteen months.02 In March 2006, the situation deteriorated to such
a degree that the U.N. Security Council sought the assistance of
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story-id=15621 (recognizing that
four nations participated in combined military exercises in an effort to promote
interoperability and cooperation among militaries).
199. Lauren A. Kent, USS Hopper Visits Masawa, Eritrea, NAVY NEWSSTAND,
Oct. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?storyid= 15517.
200. See Phillip A. Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a
Revised Definition of Maritime Piracy, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 61, 61
(1999).
201. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: International Oceans, Environment, Health, and Aviation Law:
Continuing U.S. Navy Operations Against Indian Ocean Parties, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 700, 700 (noting that thirty-five pirate attacks occurred off Somalia's coast in
2005).
202. See Barbara Starr, U.S. Navy, Suspected Pirates Clash, CNN, Mar. 18,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/18/pirates.somalia/ (reporting
three separate pirate attacks near Somalia between November 2005 and March
2006). In November of 2005, pirates attacked a luxury cruise liner with rocket-
propelled grenades; in early March of 2006, Somali pirates kidnapped dozens of
Yemeni fishermen; and in another March incident, pirates exchanged fire with
Navy ships off the coast of Somalia. Id.
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naval forces operating off of the coast of Somalia to combat the
surging number of piratical acts. 03
On March 18, 2006, U.S. Navy ships, conducting maritime
security operations in the Indian Ocean, traded gun fire with
suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia.24 During what began as a
routine boarding, members of the boarding party soon discovered
that the crew was armed with RPGs.205 Thereafter, "[t]he suspected
pirates then opened fire on the Navy ships.20 6 The crews of the two
U.S. Navy ships returned fire which ended the encounter. During the
course of the exchange, one suspected pirate was killed and twelve
suspects were taken into U.S. custody.2 7 Navy boarding crews seized
an RPG and automatic weapons. 8 This incident follows another in
late January 2006, in which the USS WINSTON CHURCHILL
seized ten men suspected of being pirates off the coast of Somalia.20 9
An investigation revealed that according to sailors from the vessel,
which was ultimately turned into the pirate's platform, pirates had
hijacked the USS WINSTON CHURCHILL and then used it to stage
pirate attacks on merchant ships. 2t0 This particular MIO was related
to piracy, consistent with UNCLOS, and conducted pursuant to a
UNSCR, and therefore does not assist in building the case for
modern MIOs that do not involve piracy or are not carried out
pursuant to a UNSCR. It is, however, important to note that modern
203. See Crook, supra note 201, at 700-01 (providing the presidential statement
on Somalia recognizing increasing pirate attacks).
204. See Starr, supra note 202.
205. See id. (explaining that pirate attacks and hijackings in the region often
target U.N. World Food Program vessels which carry relief supplies to millions in
the region affected by draught).
206. Margaret Besheer, U.S. Navy Ships Return Fire on Suspected Pirates off
Somali Coast, VOICE OF AMERICA, Mar. 18, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-03/2006-03-18-
voa32.cfm?CFID=217134 (quoting Commander Jeff Breslau of the Navy's Fifth
Fleet based in Bahrain).
207. See id.
208. Crook, supra note 201, at 701.
209. See id. (reporting that the USS Winston S. Churchill captured sixteen
Indian and ten Somali men aboard the dhow).
210. See U.S. Navy Seizes Pirate Ship off Somalia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 23,
2006, available at http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,86072.html
(explaining that the Navy captured the dhow in response to a report that the pirates
had fired on the MV Delta Ranger, a Bahamian-flagged bulk carrier).
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day pirates may become involved in terrorism as part of an organized
crime scheme-at which time the lines may become more blurred.
IV. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE BASIS
TO AUTHORIZE BOARDINGS
Historically, there have been a number of treaties the purpose of
which is to combat terrorism.211 Often, the treaties were in direct
response to an attack that had just occurred.212 Today, there exist a
number of international treaties that have helped to clarify the legal
landscape with respect to terrorism. 213 This section examines recent
developments in international law that are specifically related to the
increased need to combat terrorism on the high seas. In particular, it
examines the SUA and its 2005 Protocol in light of terrorists
smuggling dangerous weapons, which is not a new phenomenon.
Rather, it is a phenomenon that long preceded the events of 9/11.214
Among the most recent and most relevant to MIOs is the SUA,
developed in response to the Achille Lauro Incident, and the SUA
2005 Protocol, both of which will be described in detail below.
A. MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS ON
TERRORISM
Currently, there are twelve major multilateral conventions and
protocols related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism.
215
211. See U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Overview-Conventions
Against Terrorism,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism convention overview.html (explaining
that the twelve universal conventions and protocols against terrorism were created
by the United Nations and its special agencies).
212. See, e.g., Brad J. Kieserman, Preventing and Defeating Terrorism at Sea:
Practical Considerations for Implementation of the Draft Protocol to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA), reprinted in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
AND CHINA 425, 426-27 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation was developed in response to the Achille Lauro Incident).
213. See, e.g., SUA, supra note 11; SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11.
214. See Barry L. Rothberg, Note, Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism in the United States, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 79-80 (1997).
215. See UNODC, supra note 211 (providing that the twelve treaties were
630 [22:583
BRIDGING THE GAP
They are: the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed On Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention"), 1963;216 the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
("Hague Convention"), 1970;217 the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal
Convention"), 1971;2I8 the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
1973;219 the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
("Hostages Convention"), 1979;220 the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear Materials Convention"),
1980;221 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence
at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988;22 the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
1988;223 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988;224
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
of Detection, 1991 ;225 the International Convention for the
developed between 1963 and 1999).
216. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
217. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
218. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
219. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
220. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
221. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3 1980,
18 I.L.M. 1419.
222. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-19,
1589 U.N.T.S. 474.
223. SUA, supra note 11.
224. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No.
101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
225. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359.
2007]
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 1997;226 and the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
1999.227 This article focuses on the SUA and its 2005 Protocol,
which are discussed below.
B. THE ACHILLELAURO INCIDENT
More than twenty years ago, the United States confronted a
hostage-taking incident at sea carried out by terrorists.228 On October
7, 1985, members of the Palestine Liberation Front ("PLF") hijacked
the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flagged vessel, which was en route from
Alexandria to Port Said in Egypt.22 9 The PLF members had
successfully smuggled grenades, automatic weapons, and explosives
on board the vessel with the intention of either using them to attack
Israel or to take Israeli citizens hostage.23 ° While on board the vessel,
the terrorists took hostages, asserting that they would be exchanged
when Israel released fifty Palestinians from jails in Israel, and
threatened to blow up the ship.2 1 The following day, the terrorists
shot one of the passengers, Leon Klinghoffer, an American citizen
who was Jewish, and threw his body overboard.23 2 When the ship
arrived in Egypt, law enforcement officials assisted in obtaining the
release of the hostages, and took the terrorists into custody, but did
so without actually arresting them. 233 The U.S. government was
unable to obtain cooperation from Egypt to extradite the terrorists.
When the U.S. government learned that Egyptian officials were
planning to fly the terrorists into Tunisia, it pressured Tunisia into
226. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9,
1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284.
227. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229.
228. See Kieserman, supra note 212, at 425 (specifying that the hijackers were
members of the Palestine Liberation Front, which is a faction of the Palestine
Liberation Organization).
229. See id. at 425-26 (noting that while the four hijackers originally intended to
stay aboard the cruise ship as passengers, they changed their plans and seized the
ship when the ship's crew discovered their weapons after leaving Alexandria)
(emphasis added).
230. See id.
231. See id. at 426.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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refusing to allow the plane to land.234 While the flight carrying the
terrorists was airborne, the U.S. Navy intercepted the plane and
forced it to land in Sicily. 235 The Italian government took the
terrorists, including group leader Mohammed Abbas, into custody for
prosecution but Italy failed to detain them.236 Italy released some of
the terrorists on bail, who ended up fleeing the country.237 Abbas
traveled to Yugoslavia, South Yemen, and Iraq, until he was
captured in April 2003 in Baghdad by U.S. forces. 238 Following 9/11,
with the Achille Lauro Incident in mind, many experts in
international and maritime law feared a possible maritime incident
similar to 9/11 would be carried out on a passenger-bearing vessel,
large commercial cargo ship, or oil tanker, possibly in a major
channel or strait.239
In 1986, in response to the Achille Lauro Incident, the IMO
proposed the creation of a new convention to deal with maritime
terrorism, and an ad hoc committee was established to prepare a text
for the SUA.24 °
C. PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME
NAVIGATION (SUA) AND ITS 2005 PROTOCOL
The SUA is of paramount significance to modern MIOs. Adopted
in 1988 and entered into force in 1992, the main purpose of SUA is
to ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing
unlawful acts against ships. 24 1 These acts include the seizure of ships
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. (describing the runway "standoff' between the American and Italian
militaries regarding who would take custody of the detainees).
237. See id.
238. See id. (explaining that Iraq refused extradition of Abbas after he entered
the country).
239. See id. at 431 (hypothesizing that a ship could be used as a "collision
weapon for destroying critical infrastructure," sunk in a shipping channel to block
traffic, or, in the case of fuel tankers, sunk to disrupt fuel markets or cause
environmental damage).
240. See id. at 426-27.
241. See SUA, supra note 11, pmbl., 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224 (asserting that
violent acts against maritime vessels "seriously affect the operation of maritime
services" and calling for a unified approach to the prevention of such acts).
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by force, and acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the
placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or
damage it, if the act endangers or is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship.242 Under the terms of SUA, Member States
must either extradite or prosecute alleged offenders.243
In October 2005, a Diplomatic Conference was convened by the
IMO in order to revise the SUA Treaties and adopt the amendments
to SUA.21 Seventy-four States Parties to the original SUA treaties
participated in this conference.245 While two SUA treaties were
revised in 2005, the pertinent treaty relevant to this discussion is the
Protocol of 2005 to the SUA ("2005 SUA Protocol").246 A copy of
the text adopted by the Conference was prepared on November 1,
2005.247 The 2005 SUA Protocol opened for signature on February
14, 2006 in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and
Spanish. 48 It will enter into force ninety days after the twelfth
country signs it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or
approval (or deposits an instrument to that effect).249
The 2005 SUA Protocol enumerates additional offenses not found
in the earlier SUA treaties, and further states that it is an offense
within the meaning of the Convention if a person unlawfully and
intentionally acts:
242. See id. art. 3, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224-25 (applying the convention's
substantive prohibitions to anyone who "attempts" or "threatens" to commit any
prohibited act, as well as those who "abets" the commission of any prohibited act).
243. See id. art. 10, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 226-27 (requiring parties to take alleged
offenders into custody, and "submit the case without delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with
the laws of that State.").
244. See Final Act of the International Conference on the Revision of the SUA
Treaties, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 15/23 (Oct. 19, 2005).
245. See id.
246. SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11.
247. See id.
248. See id. arts 17, 24.
249. See id. art. 18; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROTOCOLS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE
SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION FACT SHEET 14 (2005) available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2005&m=October&x=20051027150304sjhtropO.5999109&t=-xarchives
/xarchitem.html (detailing the new amendments and provisions added at the
international conference).
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(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from any
act[, and]:
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship
any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in
a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or
serious injury or damage; or
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or
other hazardous or noxious substance . . . in such
quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to
cause death or serious injury or damage; or
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious
injury or damage; or ....
(b) transports on board a ship:
(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it
is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause,.
. . death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of
intimidating a population, or compelling a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act; or
(ii)any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as
defined in article 1; or
(iii)any source material, special fissionable material, or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be
used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other
nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an
IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
(iv)any equipment, materials or software or related
technology that significantly contributes to the design,
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the
intention that it will be used for such purpose.250
Additionally, a person violates the 2005 SUA Protocol by
"unlawfully and intentionally transport[ing] another person on board
a ship knowing that the person" has violated SUA with the purpose
of protecting that individual from criminal prosecution. 251 As such,
harboring an individual who has used weapons against a vessel or
transported prohibited material is also violative of the 2005 Protocol,
and could create liability for a ship master who knows that such an
individual is on board his or her vessel.
Section (b) (iii), which considers the use of "a ship in a manner
that causes death or serious injury or damage" an offense, is the
provision which would cover use of a ship as a missile or otherwise
similar to the use of airplanes on 9/11.252 The 2005 SUA Protocol
does not, however, include an independent mechanism of
enforcement.253 States which are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol are
required to ensure that they possess an adequate legal framework
(including criminal penalties, and the ability to exercise appropriate
jurisdiction) to hold an individual liable, either criminally, civilly, or
administratively, for committing an act in violation of SUA.254
D. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE SHIP MASTER AND
THE FLAG STATE UNDER SUA AND ITS 2005 PROTOCOL
SUA details the responsibilities and roles of the master of the ship,
the flag state, and the receiving state to facilitate the delivery of any
person believed to have committed an offense under the Convention,
and to furnish evidence pertaining to the alleged offense to the
appropriate state party.255 A ship's master has the authority to turn
250. SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11, art. 4.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Kieserman, supra note 212, at 439-40 (suggesting that the IMO
provide each member state with the authority to board, and authorize other states to
board, vessels suspected of violating the agreement within their territory).
254. See SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11.
255. See SUA, supra note 11, art. 8.
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over to a state party any individual whom the ship's master has
reasonable grounds to believe has committed an act in violation of
the 2005 SUA Protocol.256 This broad authority could reasonably be
interpreted to permit the ship's master to consent to a boarding of his
vessel for the purpose of turning over an individual reasonably
believed to have violated the 2005 SUA Protocol to a state party.
Thus this would be consistent with the more generalized consent of a
master to protect the safety and security of his vessel found in the
ISPS and ISM.
The 2005 SUA Protocol also adds a section authorizing MIOs.2 57
Specifically, the 2005 SUA Protocol enumerates procedures
applicable to states parties that desire to board a ship flying the flag
of another state party where the requesting party has reasonable
grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense under
SUA.258 Prior to a boarding, the authorization and cooperation of the
flag state is required.2 9 The requesting party shall not board the ship
or take measures without express authorization of the flag state. 6°
Upon request, the flag state shall either authorize the requesting party
to board, decline the request to board, or conduct the boarding and
search either itself or in concert with the requesting party.26'
However, if the flag state does not respond within four hours, the
requesting party may still have the justification to board the vessel.
Following the accession to the 2005 SUA Protocol, any state party
may notify the IMO Secretary-General that it would permit a
particular requesting state party to board and search a ship flying its
flag, including cargo and persons on board, to determine if an act
prohibited by the 2005 SUA Protocol has occurred.262 A state party
can also notify the IMO Secretary-General that it authorizes a
requesting party to board and search the ship, its cargo and persons
on board, and to question the persons on board to determine if an
256. See SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11, arts. 8, 8bis.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.; see also SUA, supra note 11, art. 8 (authorizing a ship's master to
turn over suspected violators to any other state party).
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offense has been, or is about to be, committed. 263 Although this
provides for IMO authorization where a state party does not hear
back from the flag state in a timely manner, the SUA is clearly
premised on support for the principle that a flag state must consent to
boardings for MIOs.
In carrying out MIOs consistent with the 2005 SUA Protocol, the
use of force is to be avoided except when necessary to ensure the
safety of officials or persons on board, or where the officials are
obstructed from executing authorized actions.2 64 Safeguards are
included when a state party takes measures against a ship, including
boarding.265 Specifically, a state party: may not endanger the safety
of life at sea; must ensure that all persons on board are treated in a
manner which preserves human dignity and is in keeping with human
rights law; must take due account of safety and security of the ship
and its cargo; must ensure that measures that are taken are
environmentally sound; and must take reasonable efforts to avoid
unduly detaining or delaying a vessel.266 In the event that damage or
other loss occurs in the execution of a boarding under the 2005 SUA
Protocol, states parties are liable when the grounds for the boarding
are unfounded or when the measures taken are excessive. 267 The
2005 SUA Protocol authorizes law enforcement or other officials
from warships or military aircraft to carry out such boardings.268
V. U.N. AUTHORITIES FOR MARITIME
INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS
Based on the historical precedents for MIOs, it is clear that with an
appropriate UNSCR MIOs can lawfully be used to deter threats to
peace and security.269 What if, however, there is not a clear UNSCR
taken in a particular case, or against a particular country, such as past
263. See SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11, arts. 8, 8bis.
264. See id.
265. See id (requiring states to comply with applicable international law when
boarding a ship under this convention).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the historical precedents for MIOs
by focusing on the U.N. Security Council and Rhodesia, Iraq, the Former
Yugoslavia, and Haiti).
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UNSCRs related to Iraq, Haiti, and the Former Yugoslavia? Are
there other authorities under the U.N. Charter that provide a basis for
MIOs? This section first explores authority under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. This section then examines the panoply of UNSCRs
related to the issue of combating terrorism generally in the years
following 9/11 to determine what authority, if any, can be derived
from these UNSCRs to justify MIOs more generally, thus obviating
the need for specific UNSCRs on a case-by-case basis as done in the
past.
A. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER U.N. CHARTER, ARTICLE 51
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter explicitly affirms a state's inherent
right of self-defense, it states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.270
This cardinal principle and authority under international law
provides the basis for MIOs in the event that the U.N. Security
Council has not taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. U.S. doctrine on self-defense
requires necessity (in response to a hostile act or hostile intent) and
proportionality.27" ' Accordingly, a nation that is responding to an
armed attack-such as the United States in response to 9/11--could
determine that boarding a vessel at sea that is suspected of harboring
terrorists or weapons is properly considered an act of self-defense.
270. U.N. Charter art. 51.
271. See, e.g., COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 4.3.2
(outlining the "U.S. doctrine on self-defense, set forth in the JCS Standing Rules of
Engagement for the U.S. Forces, that the use of force in self-defense against armed
attack, or the threat of imminent armed attack, rests upon" necessity and
proportionality).
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Arguably, the same rule should apply in the case of maritime
interdiction of terrorists or WMD on the basis of anticipatory self-
defense.272 This is to say, if a harbored terrorist was planning an
imminent attack, or if the weapons were being ferried for the purpose
of carrying out an imminent attack, then under a theory of
anticipatory self-defense it would not be necessary to wait until such
attack occurs to act in self-defense under Article 51-such actions
could be taken to prevent an imminent attack. Boarding such a
vessel, mounting an inspection, and obtaining biometric data from its
crew or passengers, even without the shipmaster's consent, could be
viewed as proportional to a great enough threat.
International law allows belligerent warships during an armed
conflict to search and visit foreign-flagged merchant vessels to
determine whether the merchant vessel is neutral or enemy, the
nature of the cargo of the vessel, and other facts bearing on the
vessels relation to the armed conflict. 273 There are limitations,
however. For example, this right of search and visit exists outside of
neutral waters only, and does not authorize search and visits of
warships. 274 Furthermore, it is well-established in international law
that a state engaged in an armed conflict may, on self-defense
grounds, stop and search a foreign-flagged vessel where it is
reasonably suspected of carrying weapons to another party to the
conflict. 275 During the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962),
"France stopped and searched several thousand foreign vessels on
the high seas for weapons destined for rebel forces, claiming the
right of self-defence. ' ' 276 Additionally, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran
272. The authors recognize that many nations are uncomfortable with the notion
of anticipatory self-defense or preemptive war.
273. See COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 7.6.1
(describing U.S. Naval visit and search procedures); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 31-2 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., Cambridge
University Press 1995).
274. See COMMANDER'S NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at § 7.6 (specifying
that "[w]arships are not subject to visit and search"); INTERNATIONAL PEACE
CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE CONVENTION (XIII) OF 1907 CONCERNING THE RIGHTS
AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS IN NAVAL WAR art. 2 (The Endowment 1915).
275. See HARRIS, supra note 28, at 928-29 (illustrating the long-established
right to stop and search a vessel using the Iranian search of the Barber Perseus and
the Cuban Quarantine).
276. Id. at 929.
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stopped and searched a British merchant vessel, the Barber Perseus,
claiming that the vessel was carrying arms for Iraq. 277 The British
responded:
The [United Kingdom] upholds the general principle of
freedom of navigation of the high seas. However, under
Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State such as Iran, actively
engaged in an armed conflict, is entitled to exercise its
inherent right of self-defence to stop and search a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas if there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the
other side for use in the conflict. This is an exceptional right:
if the suspicions prove to be unfounded and if the ship has not
committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the
ship's owners have a good claim for compensation for loss
caused by the delay. 78
Prior examples of the United States using the inherent right of
self-defense for boarding foreign-flagged vessels are the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis and the 1990 pre-UNSCR embargo against Iraq (for
two weeks by the United States and United Kingdom as collective
self-defense with Kuwait). 7 9
Therefore, post-9/1 1, the inherent right of self-defense, articulated
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, could be used to justify MIOs. On
September 12, 2001, the U.N. Security Council, in Resolution 1368,
condemned the 9/11 terrorism attacks in New York, Washington,
D.C., and Pennsylvania, and characterized them as a "threat to
international peace and security. ' 280 The UNSCR also recognized
"the inherent right of individual or collective-self-defence in
277. See D.R. Humphrey, Belligerent Interdiction of Neutral Shipping in
International Armed Conflict, 2 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 23, 32 (1997) (reporting
that Iran intended to detain and confiscate the cargo of "any ship suspected of
transporting goods destined for Iraq").
278. 90 HANSARD, House of Commons, col. 428, Jan. 28, 1986, quoted in
HARRIS, supra note 28, at 929.
279. See Statement of Rear Admiral William L. Schachte, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services Regarding the Military
Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 108th Cong.
(Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/April!Schachte.pdf.
280. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 162, 1.
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accordance with the Charter. ' 28' As a result, the United States
exercised its authority under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and
responded to the 9/11 armed attack. 82  In fact, the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte,
specifically reported in a letter to the U.N. Security Council that:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that
the United States of America, together with other States, has
initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of
individual and collective self-defence following the armed
attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11
September 200 1.283
Accordingly, under this analysis, LIOs, as described above, would
be legitimate as an exercise of the inherent right of self defense as
part of this armed conflict.
Outside of the fleeing Al-Qaeda and Taliban members from
Afghanistan leading to the LIOs, what authority continues to exist
more broadly in the ongoing war on terror to conduct MIOs?
According to John B. Bellinger, III, State Department Legal Advisor,
"[o]n a legal level, the United States believes that it has been and
continues to be engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, its
affiliates and supporters. The United States does not consider itself to
be in a state of international armed conflict with every terrorist group
around the world.2 84 Accordingly, the United States may be able to
legally justify other nonconsensual boardings (outside of LIOs), and
281. Id.
282. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/s-2001-946.htm; see also U.N. Charter
art. 51 (granting Member States the right of self-defense until "the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security").
283. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, supra
note 290.
284. Oral Statements by the United States Delegation to the Committee Against
Torture (May 8, 2006), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/66174.pdf (statement of John Bellinger III,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
642 [22:583
BRIDGING THE GAP
the obtaining of biometric data with or without the shipmaster's
consent, pursuant to this inherent right of self-defense as part of the
ongoing conflict with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters.
However, since the United States has limited the legal terms of its
ongoing armed conflict to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and
supporters,285 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which would permit
MIOs in furtherance of this conflict, would likely be limited to MIOs
designed to interdict Al-Qaeda and their affiliates and supporters, or
to the groups supplying weapons to these organizations (relying on
the Barber Perses and Algerian War of Independence examples
above). These authorities may not permit the United States to board
vessels that may be harboring members of other international
terrorist groups not in this category, including groups such as Hamas,
Palestine Liberation Organizations, Liberation Movement of the
Tamil Tigers of Elam, Hezbollah, etc., unless such groups are
considered to be supporting Al-Qaeda as their "affiliates" or
"supporters." However, even in this context, a nonconsensual
boarding can create diplomatic hurdles with key allies whose good
will and cooperation are essential to winning the War on Terror.
While the United States may be able to exercise its U.N. Charter
Article 51 self-defense authority in the war on terror because of the
9/11 attacks, many nations around the world have fortunately not yet
suffered an armed attack by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and therefore
cannot use a similar self-defense argument to conduct MIOs. Their
inability to do so hinders the global effort at interdicting terrorists
and their weapons on the high seas. For example, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and Indonesia may be able to invoke Article 51 self-
defense authority given the major terrorist attacks carried out in their
territories and against their people by A1-Qaeda and its affiliates. In
contrast, a state such as Costa Rica, which has not suffered a specific
attack, may not have that argument unless it considers that it is acting
285. See id.; see also Geoffrey Robertson, Time for Judgment: War on Trial:
The American Case for Self-Defence, THE ADVERTISER, Dec. 22, 2001, at 29
(arguing that the U.S. transition from a "defensive counter-attack against al-Qaeda
to an all-out offensive to obliterate the government" exceeded the scope of Article
51 rights); Anthony Clark Arend, Making the Case for an Attack on Iraq, THE
RECORD, Apr. 18, 2002, at Ill (positing that the U.S. claim of self-defense in
attacking Iraq could only be justified if there was sufficient evidence that Iraq
provided support to al-Qaeda).
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more broadly in the collective self-defense of the United States or
other nations in response to 9/11 or other terrorist attacks pursuant to
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, while Article 51 appears
to provide legitimate authority for a nation to exercise its inherent
right to self-defense, or collective self-defense of another U.N.
Member State, the legality of a particular MIO would have to be
determined based on this analysis.
B. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON COMBATING
TERRORISM POST 9/11
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter reads: "[t]he Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 286
Following the adoption of UNSCR 1368, which unequivocally
condemned the 9/11 terrorism attacks, and characterized them as a
"threat to international peace and security, ' 287 the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001.288 UNSCR
1373 reaffirmed the principle that acts of "international terrorism[]
constitute a threat to international peace and security" and called on
"[s]tates to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist
acts, including through increased cooperation and full
implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to
terrorism. "289
It specifically laid out Chapter VII U.N. authority for states to
prevent, suppress, and criminalize the funding of terrorist acts, and to
freeze without delay funds or other economic resources of
individuals engaged in terrorist acts.29° It also called on states to
refrain from providing any financial support to entities or persons
committing terrorists acts, to deny them safe haven, and specifically
called on them to "[p]revent the movement of terrorists or terrorist
groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of
286. U.N. Charter art. 39.
287. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 162, 1.
288. See S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
289. Id.
290. See id. 1.
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identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents. 29' While MIOs were not listed as
measures authorized in the UNSCR, this did signal a recognition by
U.N. Member States that terrorist movement is a threat to
international peace and security and that it requires state action.
On December 20, 2001, in UNSCR 1386, the U.N. Security
Council "determin[ed] that the situation in Afghanistan still
constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security, 292 and
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, authorized the establishment
of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the
Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security.293 The U.N.
Security Council again, in UNSCR 1526, adopted January 30, 2004,
highlighted the importance of full implementation of UNSCR 1373,
"including with regard to any member of the Taliban and the Al-
Qaida organization," and associated groups that have "participated in
the financing, planning, facilitating and preparation or perpetration of
terrorist acts. '294 Acting under Chapter VII, the U.N. Security
Council called on Member States to "[p]revent the entry into or the
transit through their territories of these individuals" and to
"[p]revent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, to these
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or
by their nationals outside their territories, or using theirflag vessels
or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types.... -295
While neither of these provisions explicitly calls on U.N. Member
States to board vessels in order to prevent individuals from entering
their territory, or from weapons being transferred to these individuals
on flag vessels, it does call on Member States to take action. An
argument could be made that under this authority a Member State
would be carrying out this Chapter VII mandate if it were to board a
vessel to prevent Taliban or Al-Qaeda personnel or associated groups
from traveling to such location that it could enter their territory. This
is independent of other Article 51 self-defense authorities that may
otherwise exist in accordance with the previous section. Likewise, a
291. Id. 2 (g) (emphasis added).
292. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 165.
293. See id. 1; see also U.N. Charter ch. VII.
294. S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004).
295. Id. 1 (emphasis added).
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similar argument could be made with respect to boarding a vessel to
prevent the transfer of illegal weapons to these individuals. It is,
however, unlikely that such boardings would be welcomed.
While not directly addressing MIOs, UNSCR 1540, adopted April
28, 2004, calls upon all states "[t]o promote the universal adoption
and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthen[] . .
multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. '"296
UNSCR 1540 further calls on states "to take cooperative action to
prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons,
[and] their means of delivery," consistent with their domestic and
international legal obligations. 297 This language further demonstrates
the need to control the transit of WMD, but does not provide any
new legal authorities.
UNSCR 1617, adopted July 29, 2005, also provides language that
may support MIOs. The U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII, called on states to "[p]revent the entry into or the transit through
their territories" of Al-Qaeda, and Taliban, and associated groups,
and to "[p]revent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, to
these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their
territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their
flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel. 298 However,
this obligation, read narrowly, only applies to those states whose
nationals or others attempting to conduct such sales or transfers from
"their territories or by their nationals outside their territories" or
"using their flag vessels"-this does not appear to provide any new
authority to an outside enforcing state who desires to conduct a
MIO.299 It also specifically urged U.N. Member States "to ensure that
stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated
as soon as possible."300
UNSCR 1618, adopted August 4, 2005, which focused exclusively
on Iraq, urged U.N. Member States "to prevent the transit of
296. S.C. Res. 1540, 8(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
297. Id. 10.
298. S.C. Res. 1617, 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (Jul. 29, 2005) (emphasis
added).
299. Id.
300. Id. 9.
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terrorists to and from Iraq" and "arms for terrorists." '' While not
specifically authorizing MIOs to prevent terrorist travel, resolution
1618 does give a right to enforcing states to take action to prevent
the transit of terrorists and their weapons, and resolutions 1617 and
1618 together stress the importance of Member State action to
prevent the transit of terrorists and their weapons.3 °2
UNSCR 1624, adopted September 14, 2005, provides further
language that supports the use of MIOs. In the resolution, the U.N.
Security Council reminded states that they "must cooperate fully in
the fight against terrorism .. .in order to find, deny safe haven and
bring to justice . . . [to] any person who supports, facilitates,
participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning,
preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe
havens."30 3 It furthermore called on Member States to "cooperate,
inter alia, to strengthen the security of their international borders,
including by combating fraudulent travel documents and, to the
extent attainable, by enhancing terrorist screening and passenger
security procedures." 3°4 While this UNSCR was primarily designed
to prohibit incitement to commit terrorist acts, it emphasized the
U.N. Security Council's recognition that safe haven for terrorists in
any location - whether in a country or at sea - and terrorist travel,
contribute to the threat to international peace and security brought
about by terrorism.
In the specific contexts of preventing the transfer of VvMD and
other weapons to and from North Korea and Iran, UNSCRs 1695 and
1696, respectively, were passed in July, 2006.305 While neither
resolution prescribed the method by which nations should prevent
such transfers of weapons, they required Member States to "exercise
vigilance" to prevent transfers of "missile and missile related-items,
materials, goods and technology" to and from North Korea,30 6 and
transfer of "items, materials, goods and technology that could
301. S.C. Res. 1618, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1618 (Aug. 4,2005).
302. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 298, TT 1-2.
303. S.C. Res. 1624, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sep. 14, 2005) (emphasis
added).
304. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
305. See S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006); S.C. Res.
1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
306. S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 305, $T 3-4.
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contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
and ballistic missile programmes. 3 °7 In the exercise of such
vigilance, MIOs could play a key role in preventing such transfers,
however, no new maritime authority was included in the resolutions.
Taken together, the more than ten UNSCRs adopted since 9/11,
which focus exclusively on the issue of combating terrorism,
demonstrate the tremendous efforts being taken to find ways to
counter the threat to international peace and security arising from
terrorism. While none of these UNSCRs specifically includes
language authorizing blanket or specific MIOs, they do collectively
call on Member States "to combat by all means threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,"38 to
prevent entry to or transit through their territories, to prevent
smuggling of arms, to prevent safe haven of terrorists, and lastly to
''exercise vigilance" in preventing transfers of weapons to and from
certain states.30 9 In order to accomplish these myriad goals, MIOs
could play a key role in the future, and render this UNSCR regime
more effective.
VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT REGIMES AND
AUTHORITIES FOR MARITIME INTERCEPTION
OPERATIONS
Neither the United States nor any other country has secured
universal boarding agreements with other countries,310 which would
permit boarding in all instances. However, limited scope boarding
agreements have been developed in certain areas.3 1' Such agreements
can provide a country with the authority to board any of a nation's
vessels without flag-state or master's consent.
Recognizing the ever-increasing impact that narcotics trafficking
and human smuggling have on modem society, the United States and
307. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 305, 5.
308. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 162 (emphasis added).
309. S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 305, 3-4; S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 305,
5.
310. See Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom
of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131, 163-
64 (2005) (noting that a lack of consensus stems from state reluctance to
undermine the commitment to develop multilateral boarding treaties).
311. See discussion infra Part VI.
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the international community have made great strides over the past
few decades in combating these transnational problems. 1 2
Advancements in international law and improved boarding
agreements with third parties have aided in deterring and disrupting
these criminal acts.3" 3 This is due in part to increased flexibility in a
nation's capability to board and inspect vessels suspected to be
transporting either narcotics or human beings. This section analyzes
what authorities can be derived from the U.S. and international
responses to illegal narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and
trafficking, and through the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"),
which was designed to prohibit the transport of WMD and WMD
technology.
A. COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS REGIME
As referenced above, during operations with joint forces in the
Arabian Gulf in December of 2003, the USS DECATUR (DDG 73)
intercepted several vessels found to contain a total of two tons of
methamphetamine, hashish, and heroin with an estimated value of
eight to ten million dollars. 314 An investigation into the crew revealed
links to Al-Qaeda.3 5 Moreover, during 2004 hearings before the
House Committee on International Relations, Senior U.S. Agency
officials indicated that Afghanistan's opium output has regained
historically high levels.316 Early intelligence estimates have shown
312. See Becker, supra note 310, at 131-33 (describing the development of
UNCLOS as an "immediate reaction to prevent the breakdown of law and order on
the oceans") (quoting Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations
before the U.N. General Assembly) (citation omitted).
313. See Becker, supra note 310, at 147-51 (describing the PSI as "perhaps the
most robust project among the several new initiatives that have emerged to
address" global threats such as criminal acts). The author also lists events
occurring within the first eighteen months of PSI, including international
agreements. Id. at 155-59, tbl. 2.
314. See Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy, 2004:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. 25 (2004)
[hereinafter Afghanistan Drugs Hearings] (Statement of Mark S. Kirk, Rep.,
Illinois); see also USS Decatur Captures Possible Al-Qaida Associated Drug-
Smuggling Dhow in Arabian Gulf, NAVY NEWSSTAND, Dec. 19, 2003,
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story-id= 1163 [hereinafter USS
Decatur Captures Possible Drug-Smuggling Dhow].
315. See USS Decatur Captures Possible Drug-Smuggling Dhow, supra note
314.
316. Afghanistan Drugs Hearings, supra note 314, at 42 (Statement of DEA
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links-if not the perfect conditions-for Afghanistan's opium profits
to directly fund Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist
organizations.317 As such, anti-narcotics trafficking treaties and
agreements have a renewed relevance in international law and the
global war on terror.318
In order to successfully interdict a shipment of illegal narcotics,
generally, rapid action must be taken. Although UNCLOS provides
for universal jurisdiction on the high seas for certain crimes, counter-
narcotics operations are not among the general exceptions that confer
jurisdiction.3"9 Article 108 of UNCLOS demands that all states shall
cooperate in illicit trafficking of narcotics or psychotropic
substances; however, it does not provide express authority for drug-
related interdictions.3 20 A party that has reasonable grounds to
believe a vessel is engaged in the illicit traffic of narcotics, therefore,
would be required to request consent from the flag state to board and
search the vessel in order to permit a lawful search over the objection
of the vessel's master.
In order to facilitate flag-state consent to a vessel's boarding, and
recognizing the problems in the inherent right of self-defense
argument as applied to a purely criminal activity, the United States
has sought bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states.321
The state of the flagged vessel can consent by agreement to the
boarding and search of a particular vessel, or to board their vessels
generally in order to prevent the trafficking of these illegal
substances. 322 The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of 1980,323
Adm'r Karen Tandy).
317. See id. at 24.
318. See Becker, supra note 310, at 180 ("[T]he U.S. strategy to combat drug
trafficking may offer helpful comparisons to the PSI strategy to combat WMD
proliferation, especially in the context of negotiating WM!D-related boarding
agreements with key flag states").
319. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 110, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438; see also
Becker, supra note 310, at 202-04 (analyzing universal jurisdiction on the high
seas under UNCLOS).
320. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 108, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437; see also
Becker, supra note 310, at 179 (explaining that UNCLOS does not provide legal
authority for boarding ships to interdict narcotics).
321. See Becker, supra note 310, at 179 (analyzing the U.S. strategy for
pursuing flag-state consent to search vessels).
322. See id.
323. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) (2000).
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passed by the U.S. Congress, asserts expanded U.S. Criminal
jurisdiction over narcotics trafficking by authorizing U.S. forces to
exercise jurisdiction on the high seas and far from coastal waters.
Moreover, the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("U.N. Narcotics
Convention") enables a flag state to authorize another state to board
and search vessels suspected in the illicit traffic of narcotics.324 The
U.N. Narcotics Convention, in its appendices, specifically lists which
narcotics are considered to be illegal."'
Specifically, Article 17 of the U.N. Narcotics Convention
authorizes states parties to consider entering into bilateral or regional
agreements or arrangements to carry out, or enhance the
effectiveness of, the provisions of this article.326 The United States
has forcefully pursued the agreements contemplated in Article 17,
and has successfully negotiated ship boarding agreements for
counter-narcotics purposes with several key Central American
countries also plagued with illegal narcotics that either transit
through, or are destined for, their territorial seas and/or land,
including Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.32 7  These
agreements are mutually advantageous, as many of these countries
do not have resources sufficient to successfully interdict drug
smuggling, thus permitting the United States to augment their
capabilities with its own vessels, and hopefully increase their
capacities for future interdictions through joint and combined
counter-narcotics operations. Likewise, the United States, as a major
destination country, is advantaged in that it can reduce the supply of
324. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances art. 17(3)-(4), Dec. 20, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
101-4, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter U.N. Narcotics Convention].
325. See id. Annex, tbls. I & 1I; see also Becker, supra note 310, at 180
(explaining that similar tables do not exist in reference to PSI).
326. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 324, art. 17(9).
327. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Cooperation for the Suppression of Illicit
Maritime Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with
Implementing Agreement, U.S.-Honduras, Mar. 29, 2000, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS
159; Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea and Air,
U.S.-Nicaragua, June 1, 2001, 2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 63; Agreement of Cooperation
Concerning United States Access to and Use of Facilities at the International
Airport of El Salvador for Aerial Counter-narcotics Activities, Mar. 31, 2000, 2000
U.S.T. LEXIS 134.
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narcotics arriving at its shores by minimizing the flow of narcotics
from South and Central America, and the Caribbean.
Another possible line of analysis derives from the protective
principle under general international law and specifically, Article 27
of UNCLOS.328 In general, the protective principle argues that a state
can protect itself against acts which occur outside of its territory, but
which threaten the state.329 UNCLOS Article 27 provides that a state
should exercise its criminal jurisdiction onboard a vessel passing
through the territorial sea only:
a. if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
b. if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country
or the good order of the territorial sea;
c. if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested
by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or
consular officer of the flag State; or
d. if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.33 °
A 1985 U.S. case, United States v. Gonzalez,33 1 examined this
subject. In Gonzalez, the U.S. Coast Guard seized a Honduran vessel
carrying marijuana, with the consent of Honduran authorities,
approximately 125 miles off of the coast of Florida.332 In so doing,
the Coast Guard relied on the Marijuana on the High Seas Act of
328. See Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the
Legal Challenges, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 262 (2005) (arguing that the
protective principle ought to be expanded from the criminal narcotics arena to the
national security context).
329. See id.
330. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 27(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
331. United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (affirming a trial
court's refusal to dismiss a criminal indictment on constitutional due process
grounds).
332. See id. at 934 (explaining that the U.S. Coast Guard obtained permission
from the Honduran Government to search, seize, and prosecute the crew while on
board the seized vessel).
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1980,111 which permitted U.S. officials to authorize searches and
seizures outside of customs waters of foreign flagged vessels when
appropriate agreements had been reached with the respective Flag
State.334 The court also stated, that without such consent, the United
States could prosecute foreign nationals or vessels under the
protective principle, which allows a nation to assert jurisdiction over
an individual who is outside of the country's territory if such
person's acts threaten the nation's security or could interfere with
governmental functions.335 This line of reasoning would appear to
grant much broader authority for countries to board and search
vessels than usually contemplated in the law enforcement
environment.
In the context of MIOs for the purposes of interdicting terrorists or
weapons on the high seas, the international experience of the United
States with counter-narcotics operations33 6 underscores the valuable
role that boarding agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, can
provide. Narcotics interdiction can no longer be pursued solely
through the policies and procedures designed to combat the Latin
American Cartel paradigm. The War on Terror requires a
transformation of existing authority, as well as new initiatives, to
adapt to the new emerging narcotics trafficking threat.
Both UNCLOS and the U.N. Narcotics Convention, taken
together, provide express authority for countries to enter into
boarding agreements for the purpose of preventing a specified
criminal activity. Whether a rogue organization's actions of
smuggling narcotics, human beings, arms, or WMD can constitute
pure criminal activity and/or be considered acts of terrorism (or the
support thereof), thus depends on the circumstances.
333. Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
334. See Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931.
335. See id. at 938-39.
336. See generally Joseph E. Kramek, Comment, Bilateral Maritime Counter-
Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is This the World of the Future?, 31
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 121 (2000) (comparing the advantages of bilateral
and multilateral boarding agreements).
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B. HUMAN SMUGGLING OPERATIONS REGIME
Similar to the counter-narcotics regime, tremendous efforts have
been taken over the past five plus years to prevent both the
trafficking and smuggling of human beings across borders.
Approximately 600,000-800,000 persons are trafficked annually
across international borders for the primary purposes of commercial
sexual exploitation and forced labor.337 Human smuggling rings have
also developed in recent years, which transport illegal immigrants or
migrants across borders, with and without their consent, for the
purposes of migration, employment, forced labor, and prostitution.338
Over the past several decades, organized transnational crime
networks have developed to profit from this international trafficking
and smuggling of human beings across borders. 3 9
To address these concerns, the international community has sought
to enhance laws that prevent this transit of human beings across
international borders, whether by land, air, or sea. The 2000 U.N.
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime34° and its
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,341
is the primary international instrument addressing this. Specifically,
Article 8 enables a flag state to authorize another state to board and
search vessels suspected of smuggling migrants.342 This is similar to
337. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65983; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, FACTS
ABOUT HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60949.pdf (detailing U.S. efforts to
combat trafficking).
338. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights,
MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, March 2005,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/issuemar05.cfm (distinguishing human
trafficking, a non-consensual, coercive-based practice by means of threat and
force, from human smuggling, a consensual-based transaction "where the
transporter and the transportee agree to circumvent immigration control for
mutually advantageous reasons").
339. See id.
340. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/25, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).
341. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).
342. See id. art. 8(2).
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the authorities contemplated in the counter-narcotics regime. The
fact that flag-state consent is required in both the counter-narcotics
and human trafficking and smuggling contexts limits the overall
effectiveness of such regimes to accomplish their goals for several
reasons.
First, some flag states may have an incentive to ignore narcotics
and human smuggling, whether consensual or not, by their own
citizens if such activities result in large remittances of money back
into their economies. Second, the time required to obtain flag-state
consent if a boarding agreement does not exist will negatively impact
the ability of a requesting party to successfully interdict the illicit
activity. Third, even if the requesting party were able to detain a
vessel while awaiting flag-state consent to a search prior to boarding,
and desired to do so, there could be humanitarian reasons why this is
not possible. In the context of migrant smuggling, for example,
interdicted vessels are often overcrowded, lack fresh water, are rife
with disease, and have persons requiring immediate medical
attention, food, and water,343 which may not be available while the
requesting party waits for flag-state consent. If such an activity was
determined to constitute actual slavery as contemplated in
UNCLOS, 344 then consent would not be required; however, this
determination is rarely made. These precedents in the realm of
counter-narcotics and human smuggling operations lend support to
the notion that new international agreements can be reached to
provide additional authority to board vessels engaged in a growing
criminal enterprise; however, these precedents do not authorize non-
consensual boardings without the consent of the flag state.
C. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)
The PSI was developed in response to the increase in proliferation
of WMD and their delivery systems.3 45 The PSI builds on previous
343. See JOANNE VAN SELM & BETSY COOPER, THE NEW "BOAT PEOPLE:"
ENSURING SAFETY AND DETERMINING STATUS, 8 (2006), available at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Boat PeopleReport.pdf (reporting on the
conditions as well as issues and policies involved in migration by sea).
344. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 1 10(1)(b), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438 (establishing
a warship's right to visit a foreign ship where there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is engaged in the slave trade).
345. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROLIFERATION
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efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of
WMD, and is consistent with international treaties, the U.N. Security
Council Presidential Statement of January of 2002, and recent
statements of the G-8 and the European Union recognizing the need
for stronger action to prevent proliferation of WMD.346 The January
2002 U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement specifically
declared that the proliferation of all WMD constituted a threat to
peace and security, and acknowledged the need for Members States
to prevent proliferation. 3 7 The G-8 and European Union statements
have likewise urged more coherent and concerted efforts to prevent
the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials.348
It has been argued that the SOSAN Incident played a key role in
the decision to launch PSI.349 On December 9, 2002, Spanish forces
encountered a vessel in the Arabian Sea that did not reveal its
nationality. As it turned out, the vessel was owned by a North
Korean company, and while the cargo was listed as cement, it was
also carrying fifteen scud missiles.35 ° This incident highlighted the
urgent need to develop a regime for preventing the transit of WMD.
In April, 2003, French authorities ordered one of their own vessels to
be searched in port and Egypt, and discovered twenty-two metric
tons of dual-use aluminum tubes.351 It was becoming clear that
maritime commerce was contributing to the proliferation of WMD.
What is not clear in PSI, however, is whether it was designed to
focus primarily on state actors known to facilitate the transport of
SECURITY INITIATIVE, Sept. 15, 2003,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24252.pdf (profiling the PSI and
listing the eleven countries in the PSI core group as: Australia, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and the
United States).
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See Ashley J. Roach, A Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Countering
Proliferation by Sea, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
CHINA 351 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2006) (detailing two developments
that occurred in December, 2002, which influenced the development of the PSI,
specifically the SOSAN Incident and the publication of the U.S. National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction).
350. See id.
351. See Becker, supra note 310, at 154.
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WMD, such as North Korea and Iran, non-State actors such as Al-
Qaeda,3 51 or both.
The PSI was officially announced by President Bush on May 31,
2003 in Krakow, Poland, in order to combat the threat of the
proliferation of WMD.353 In launching the initiative, President Bush
stated the United States and other allies have begun working on new
agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to
seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.3 54 Initially, eleven
states, including the United States, Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, agreed to participate in the PSI.355 Over the following
several months, these states developed a Statement of Interdiction
Principles, which was agreed to on September 4, 2003.356
In December of 2003, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Singapore
joined PSI, and in April and May of 2004, both the Czech Republic
and Russia joined PSI.357 On May 31, 2004, sixty one nations met in
Krakow, Poland, and expressed political support for this initiative.358
Today, more than seventy five states are participants in the PSI.3 59
Efforts to improve the effectiveness of PSI are ongoing. On
September 25-26, 2006, the United States and nineteen other nations
met in London to focus on enhancing efforts to halt international
trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials.36°
352. See Logan, supra note 328, at 256 (stating that, according to the Statement
of Interdiction Principles, the PSI aims to prevent proliferation among "states" and
"non state actors"); see also Becker, supra note 310, at 159 (quoting Under
Secretary Bolton, who acknowledged that Iran and North Korea were states of
"proliferation concern," but that PSI efforts are not aimed at halting "worldwide
trafficking").
353. See Remarks to the People of Poland in Krakow, Poland, 39 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 700, 702 (May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Krakow Speech] (stating
that the PSI is necessary in order to provide the "means and authority" to seize
"weapons of mass destruction").
354. See id.
355. See Roach, supra note 349, at 352.
356. See id.
357. See Logan, supra note 328, at 255.
358. See Roach, supra note 349, at 352.
359. See Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, London PSI
Meeting Advances Public-Private Partnership to Combat WMD Proliferation (Sep.
26, 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73177.htm.
360. See id.
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To achieve its objectives, the PSI was designed to permit
interception of WMD on land and in the air, but has primarily
focused to date on interception at sea.361 When such weapons are
found at sea, PSI participants will attempt to board and search
vessels in the high seas and seize the vessel and its cargo if
necessary.362 However, the PSI does not specifically establish any
boarding authority,363 and accordingly, does not provide participating
states with any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in
international waters. Interdictions must be carried out consistent with
existing international law.364 Accordingly, as with the previously
discussed mechanisms, enforcement of PSI requires an analysis of
various authorities on a case by case basis to determine whether a
nonconsensual boarding is lawful under the circumstances. Policy
statements that accompanied the PSI make it clear that the PSI is an
activity and not an organization.365
In order to carry out the purposes of the PSI, recognizing that there
is no clear interdiction authority in the initiative and no enforcement
mechanism, the United States and its allies have relied on bilateral
boarding agreements and partnerships that permit them to search
ships carrying suspected cargo and seize illegal weapons and missile
technologies.366
361. See Becker, supra note 310, at 134.
362. See id.
363. See The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction
Principles, The Proliferation Security Initiative,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/#statement (last visited Mar. 13,
2007) [hereinafter PSI Interdiction Principles] (asking states to take their own
"initiative" to board and search a vessel flying "their flag" in their "internal
waters"). The interdiction principles also instruct participating states to "seriously
consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances" for the searching
of its own flag vessels by other states. Id.
364. See id. (encouraging states to support interdiction efforts to the extent to
which "national legal authorities permit" consistent with "obligations under
international law").
365. See Chairman's Conclusions, Proliferation Security Initiative: London 9-10
October, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PSIConclusions,0.pdf (allowing states
to participate in the "activity" if they accept certain principles and make an
"effective contribution").
366. See, e.g., Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with
Cyprus, U.S.-Cyprus, July 25, 2005, Temp. State Dep't No. 06-33,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50274.htm [hereinafter Ship Boarding U.S.-
Cyprus]; Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with Liberia,
U.S.-Liber., Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm [hereinafter
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As PSI participants do not undertake any long-term binding
responsibilities or obligations by agreeing to participate,367 it became
essential to develop guidelines that countries could follow to
effectuate the shared goal of PSI. Responding to this need, the
Statement of Interdiction Principles was developed in Paris, France,
in September 2003.368 The Statement of Interdiction Principles is
premised on the concept that flag-state consent is required in order to
board, search, or seize its vessels, however, it permits them to select
how such consent will be granted. 369 The key principle in the
Statement of Interdiction Principles is to establish a more
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing
to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern,
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks, including the U.N. Security Council.3 7 °
In order to support the commitments of PSI, the Statement of
Interdiction Principles encourages participating states to: (1)
undertake effective measures to interdict transport of WMD; (2)
adopt streamlined methods of sharing and exchanging information
related to proliferation; (3) review and strengthen relevant national
legal authorities and relevant international laws; and (4) take specific
actions to interdict WMD.3 7' To further facilitate the PSI,
cooperation has been sought from any state whose vessels might be
used for proliferation purposes by state or non-state actors.372 Several
Ship Boarding U.S.-Liber.]; Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding
Agreement with Croatia, U.S.-Croat., June 1, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/47086.htm [hereinafter Ship Boarding U.S.-Croat.].
The agreements contain common terms outlining their object, purpose, and extent
of obligations. See, e.g., Ship Boarding U.S.-Cyprus, supra, art. 2.
367. See Becker, supra note 310, at 149 ("[T]he PSI is not a multilateral treaty
regime.").
368. See id.
369. See Roach, supra note 349, at 353 (anticipating consent to board being
granted in "advance or on a case-by-case basis").
370. See Becker, supra note 310, at 149.
371. See id. at 149-150.
372. See Robert Joseph, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, Speech on the Proliferation Security Initiative (June 23,
2006), in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, June 23, 2006 (encouraging states to
contribute to the PSI as much as their "capabilities" and "laws" allow).
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states have signed boarding agreements to permit searches of suspect
merchant vessels under their flag.373
The first noteworthy PSI case involved the BBC China, which was
a German-owned ship, flagged in Antigua and Barbuda,374 that was
carrying thousands of gas centrifuge components that can be used to
enrich uranium.375 After becoming suspicious of this shipment in
September 2003, American and British intelligence services alerted
the German government which diverted the ship to a port in Italy
where the materials were seized.376 The cooperation of the German,
Italian, American, and British governments was essential to this
operation, which has been viewed as a success story for PSI.377 The
BBC China incident has been credited as a factor in Libya's decision
to renounce its desire to obtain nuclear weapons in December 2003,
and learning about the A.Q. Khan network's role in black-market
nuclear technology. 378 While other reported PSI-interdictions have
occurred, there are few details publicly available.379
At a PSI meeting in London in October 2003, the United States
described its proposal to begin negotiating bilateral ship boarding
agreements, similar to its counter-narcotics agreements, that would
permit a faster consent for boardings of ships suspected to be
carrying WMD, as consistent with the Statement of Interdiction
Principles.3 80 Following this, the United States has sought bilateral
boarding agreements to secure access to ships; however, to date, the
United States has only secured six bilateral boarding agreements
related to PSI including: Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Marshall
Islands, and Panama.3 1 These nations (and others like them) are
373. See Logan, supra note 328, at 273 (explaining that because the United
States has ship boarding agreements with Liberia and Panama, the United States
can now "freely board" over "30% of world's cargo vessels"); see also Roach,
supra note 349, at 354 (noting that United States is engaged in consultations and
negotiations with more than "20 additional countries" to sign ship boarding
agreements).
374. See Roach, supra note 349, at 357.
375. See Becker, supra note 310, at 155.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 155-56.
378. See Roach, supra note 349, at 357.
379. See Becker, supra note 310, at 156-58.
380. See Roach, supra note 349, at 354.
381. See Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with Belize,
U.S.-Belize, Aug. 4, 2005,
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often referred to as "flag of convenience" states due to their
relatively lax vessel registration requirements.382 Panama, Liberia,
and the Marshall Islands alone constitute more than 30% of the
world's gross tonnage of merchant ships,383 and accordingly,
represent a much more significant accomplishment than is apparent
from merely counting the numbers of agreements alone.
However, it is still unclear whether the PSI will prove to be a
fruitful way to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Some advocates
claim that the PSI has potential, but that it is difficult to determine
how effective it has been since many PSI participants have been
hesitant to publicly announce when or where interdictions have taken
place.384 Others have raised concerns that the increase in dual use
WMD materials385 will make this type of regime less effective, as
innocuous parts can be transported lawfully, but later used for an
improper purpose. What is certain is that if the United States intends
to rely on PSI bilateral boarding agreements to prevent the
proliferation of PSI, it will need more than six partner countries.
Taken as a whole, this section lends further support to the
principle that flag state consent is required for boardings and
searches of its vessels and that bilateral boarding agreements are an
effective tool in securing consent. The Statement of Interdiction
Principles also clearly lays out the notion that streamlined methods
of communications and shared information are essential.
http://www.nti.org/eresearch/officialdocs/dos/dos080405.pdf; Proliferation
Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with Marshall Islands, U.S.-Marsh.
Is., Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/35237.htm; Proliferation
Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with Panama, U.S.-Pan., May 12,
2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32858.htm; Ship Boarding U.S.-Cyprus,
supra note 366; Ship Boarding U.S.-Liber., supra note 366; Ship Boarding U.S.-
Croat., supra note 366.
382. Nuclear Threat Institute, Proliferation Security Initiative,
http://www.nti.org/f wmd4l l/flb4_6.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
383. See Roach, supra note 349, at 354.
384. See Logan, supra note 328, at 274.
385. See id. at 259 (quoting Michael Beck, The Promise and Limits of PSI, The
Monitor, Spring 2004, at 16.).
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS INTO
MORE EFFECTIVE TOOLS IN THE WAR ON
TERROR
In any discussion of developing international law, it is
important to remember the key sources of international law. These
include: treaties and agreements; customary international law, which
is the practice and custom of states over time accepted as legally
binding; UNSCRs; authorities derived from the U.N. Charter; and
Jus Cogens, which are general principles of law (but of which, not all
nations believe are binding). This article has addressed key sources
of international law 386 that relate to customary laws of the sea and
maritime commerce, counter-terrorism and maritime treaties,
bilateral ship boarding agreements, and MIOs carried out pursuant to
UNSCRs or pursuant to the U.N. Charter. In many instances, the
authorities have not been entirely clear. To add clarity, this section
first summarizes those authorities that have been identified in this
article to carry out modern MIOs in the War on Terror. Next, this
section proposes ways that nations may expand the existing
authorities for maritime interdictions.
A. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT MARITIME
INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
As this article is not intended to be an advocacy piece for or
against specific authorities, this section will simply provide the
authors' candid, and simplistic, analysis of the state of existing law.
1. A U.N. Security Council Resolution is Golden
From the incidents in Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti, and Former
Yugoslavia, it is clear that a UNSCR authorizing MIOs in a
particular country is sufficient authority to prevent terrorist travel or
the transport of WMD for use by terrorists. More generally, a
UNSCR authorizing MIOs under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
prevent terrorist travel or the proliferation of WMD would also be
sufficient authority. However, at present, no such blanket authority
386. See analysis, supra Part VI (detailing U.N. authorities for MIOs).
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exists, although there is a growing awareness within the Security
Council for the need to do more, given the panoply of post-9/l 1
counter-terrorism resolutions.387
2. Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter Always Trumps
The Algerian War of Independence from France, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Iran-Iraq War, and the pre-Iraq war collective self-
defense of Kuwait all reinforce the principle that nothing interferes
with the inherent right of self-defense of a nation. If a MIO is
necessary in the self-defense of a nation, or in the collective self-
defense of a nation, either to prevent the transport of contraband to
the enemy, or more generally, to restore the peace and security, it
would be justified. In the limited context of Afghanistan, reading
together UNSCRs 1368388 and 1386319 (establishing the ISAF), it
would naturally follow that a MIO conducted by the United States
against Al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership arising from that conflict in
self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter would be sufficient
justification. In the broader war on terror, necessary actions-
including MIOs-to thwart attacks by Al-Qaida and its affiliates or
supporters as part of ongoing conflict may also be justified under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as part of the self-defense of the
United States. When available and legitimate, Article 51 trumps
existing authorities39 ° and thus would permit MIOs provided the
operation is a legitimate exercise of self-defense.39
387. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1735, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006);
S.C. Res. 1618, U.N. Doe. S/Res/1618 (Aug. 4, 2005); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doe.
S/Res/1617 (July 29, 2005) ("[S]tressing... the important role the United Nations
plays in leading and coordinating" the effort to eliminate terrorist acts).
388. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 162, pmbl., art. I (acknowledging the 9/11
attacks as a "threat to international peace and security" and recognizing the
"inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
charter").
389. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 165, 1.
390. See U.N. Charter art. 51, para. I (setting forth that "[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence ...
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.").
391. See discussion supra Part V.A (outlining the necessity and proportionality
requirements of self-defense operations in the maritime context).
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3. When in Doubt, Obtain Flag-State Consent
It is clear from UNCLOS and, considered customary international
law, that a warship can board a foreign-flagged vessel without flag-
state consent if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship
is engaged in piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or if
the vessel is without nationality, as long as the vessel being boarded
is not a warship or other government vessel.392 However, that
unqualified blanket authority does not exist to interdict terrorists or
WMD on the high seas. A strong argument can be made under the
ISPS Code that a master's consent to a search of his vessel, with or
without flag-state consent, may be sufficient if it is for the sole
purpose of protecting the safety and security of his vessel but not
purely for the purpose of appeasing a nation which desires to board
to inspect goods or personnel. This is supported under Article 27 of
UNCLOS, which also provides that a coastal state must, "if the
master so requests," notify a representative of the flag state before
taking any steps.3 93
However, this conclusion, that there may be authority for the
Master to give consent for this limited purpose of protecting the
safety and security of his vessel, remains at odds with the time tested
principle that a flag state retains the ultimate authority to consent to
boardings, searches, and seizures of vessels flying under its flag.394
The principle of flag-state consent has been most recently validated
through the 2005 SUA Protocol and Statement of Interdiction
Principles in the PSI, which support the fundamental premise of flag-
state consent.395 Given that there are some divergent authorities, this
is an area where specific acts could be taken to expand authorities
under international law if there were to be a broad enough consensus
392. See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 110, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438 (laying out the
exception for when a foreign ship can be boarded); Montserrat Gorina-Ysem,
World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius - Towards a New
Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 645, 676 n. 122 (2004) (asserting that
UNCLOS Article 110 binds non-party states as it provides rules of customary
international law).
393. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 27, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407-08.
394. See Becker, supra note 310, at 176-77 (emphasizing the primacy of a flag-
state's control over its vessels).
395. See SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8; PSI Interdiction Principles,
supra note 363 (emphasizing the role of consent in searches and seizures).
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among countries to do so. At a minimum, some additional decisions
may be required to clarify the state of the law even if there is not
consensus to go further. If neither the flag state nor the master
consents to a boarding or search within their respective authorities,
then a separate authority, such as a UNSCR, Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter self-defense authority, or a new law will be required for a
boarding.
4. Boarding Agreements Save Time
Following the regime established for counter-narcotics operations
and the PSI, bilateral and multilateral agreements will ensure the
most expedient way to guarantee that flag-state consent exists for a
boarding, whether the master consents or not. While the existing
bilateral agreements for counter-narcotics and PSI authorize
boardings for a specific purpose,396 the United States has not secured
any "universal boarding agreements" that would permit the U.S.
authorities to board a vessel for law enforcement, security, or
humanitarian reasons.3 97 While universal agreements would clearly
be the most expedient way, there are tradeoffs in the amount of
sovereignty that a flag state is willing to cede, and an erosion of the
principle of freedom on the high seas.
5. There Are No Treaties Exactly on Point
While this article has attempted to examine the multitude of legal
justifications for MIOs, there is no treaty exactly on point
authorizing such activity. Instead, we can glean certain principles
from the 2005 SUA Protocol, which calls on nations to take action to
prevent the proliferation of explosive, radioactive or biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons, may be relied upon.398 However, the
2005 SUA Protocol does not override the longstanding principle of
flag-state consent,3 99 but instead indicates that perhaps the
international community is not ready yet to let go of this cardinal
396. See supra note 366 (citing exemplary bilateral boarding agreements).
397. See Kramek, supra note 336, at 147 (outlining barriers to multilateral
boarding agreements).
398. See SUA 2005 Protocol, supra note 11 (proscribing various WMD related
activities).
399. See id. art. 8 (requiring flag-state authorization before certain boarding).
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principle. While discouraging at best, it could be argued that most
past international counter-terrorism treaties have generally been
adopted immediately following a horrific incident calling the world's
attention to a particular threat, including, for example, the Hostages
Convention of 1979400 which followed the taking of hostages in the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and Terrorist Financing Conventions
following 9/11.401 It would be a shame to wait for another tragedy to
clarify the law.
6. The IMO Has Yet To Solve the Problem
The IMO has made significant contributions to the development of
maritime and international law, and continues to take effective action
to address emerging trends on the High Seas. ISPS is a prime
example. ISPS indicates that the master has authority to determine
access to his or her vessel for the purposes of ship safety and
security. 4° This may assist in a more expedient boarding if a flag
state cannot be contacted, or has not responded to a request, and the
master's vessel is at risk. This is a positive clarification of the views
of Member States of the IMO. The ISPS, and more generally, actions
of the IMO, however, do not come with any independent
enforcement authority or mechanism to ensure they are applied-it is
left up to the governments to implement the actions they legislate.4 °3
B. EXPANDING AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT MARITIME
INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
While the international community must continue to improve
methods to identify those terrorists who may be using commercial
vessels for transit, and to stop shipments of WMD to commercial
ports around the world, legal authority to act in a timely manner
when this information is available is crucial. This section posits ways
to enhance these existing authorities to ensure the greatest possible
400. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
401. See Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the
Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 573, 573 (1997).
402. See Trelawny, supra note 51, at Annex 1, Reg. 8.
403. See id. at 5 (delegating the responsibility of applying the ISPS Code to
Contracting Governments).
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opportunity to prevent terrorist travel and the transport of dangerous
weapons on the high seas through a robust regime that utilizes MIOs.
These possibilities can help to ensure that the world works together
as a whole to assist in capturing terrorists and WMD at sea.
1. Seek or Interpret U.N. Security Council Authority to Conduct
Maritime Interception Operations to Prevent Terrorism
While authority to conduct MIOs can be granted with express
U.N. Security Council endorsement in a resolution, how could the
United States go about this? Beginning in 2003, there have been a
series of UNSCRs related to the issue of combating terrorism.4 °4 In
this context, the U.N. Security Council has authorized a number of
means to combat terrorism, including: calling on Member States to
work together to prevent, suppress, and freeze funds, and to refrain
from financially supporting terrorist organizations; 40 5 prevent the
movement of terrorists or terrorist groups; 40 6 prevent transit of
terrorists or terrorist groups through their countries, including using
their flag vessels or aircraft for transit;407 prevent the supply of
materials to such groups; 40 8 deny terrorists safe haven and bring them
to justice;4°9 and to strengthen international borders.410 A follow-on
UNSCR granting express authority for MIOs could be adopted to
support the existing resolutions. In the event that such a resolution is
not adopted, however, an argument can be made that it is implicit in
the existing resolutions. This latter argument will likely face
tremendous criticism.
404. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 294; S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 296;
S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 298 (emphasizing the prevention of international
terrorism and maintenance of peaceful relations).
405. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 288, 1 (requiring that states criminalize
certain acts of funding and freeze certain assets).
406. See S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 294, l(b) (requiring that states prohibit
terrorists and terrorist groups from moving from state to state).
407. See id.
408. See id. at l(c) (requiring states to prevent the "direct or indirect supply"
of "arms and related materiel of all types").
409. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 288, 2 (requiring that states "[d]eny safe
haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe
havens.").
410. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 296, 3(c) (requiring that all states
"[d]evelop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement
efforts).
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2. Conduct Non-Consensual Boardings and the Taking of
Biometrics as Consistent with the U.N. Charter
The United States, in the exercise of its inherent right to self-
defense under the U.N. Charter,"' is justified in conducting MIOs
that derive from its conflict with Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their
affiliates and supporters. While this article has pointed out that there
is ambiguity in how far this authority goes, such as whether it
includes the taking of biometrics, etc., an exercise of limited MIOs
against only those vessels suspected of harboring, or supplying
weapons to, Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their affiliates and supporters,
is justifiable as consistent with the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, efforts
to carry out such MIOs may contribute to developing broader
principles or customs of international law.
3. Seek Expanded Authorities Under the International Maritime
Organization (IMO)
The IMO has already taken significant measures to enhance
security of ships and port facilities post-9/l1,412 and could take
additional steps to legislate nonconsensual boarding of vessels in
peacetime to interdict terrorists and WMD. In particular, it could
focus on expanding the authority granted to ship masters in ISPS to
permit them to consent to any search of their vessels for terrorist
purposes. Moreover, the IMO would be well served to focus strongly
on improving regimes of communications between flag states, their
masters, the vessels, and third countries. Clearly this article has
demonstrated the importance of communication between third
countries and flag states when they desire to board a vessel, and
between flag states and masters of the vessels. Delays in
communications can result in misunderstandings between countries
and cause diplomatic harm. Additionally, they can result in inability
to prevent terrorist travel.1 3
411. U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1.
412. See Rosalie Balkin, The International Maritime Organization and Maritime
Security, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 16-18 (2006) (describing the ISPS as the IMO's
most aggressive measure after 9/11).
413. See Balkin, supra note 412, at 18 (explaining that masters of ports need to
be able to communicate among ships to ensure the security of countries and their
ports).
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4. Continue to Press for PSI and Other Bilateral Boarding
Agreements
While the United States has only obtained six PSI boarding
agreements to date;414 a greater international understanding of
terrorist travel, the means of proliferating WMD, and the need to
ensure that ports are safe from detonation of weapons that are being
harbored on board vessels may result in a greater number of such
agreements in the future. An international regime that focuses more
on "universal boarding agreements" would support both security and
law enforcement purposes, however, it may be too far-reaching for
sovereign states to agree to. At a minimum, the equivalent of the PSI
agreements to also cover terrorist travel, not purely the transport of
weapons, should be considered.
5. Seek an International Convention that Authorizes Non-
Consensual Boarding of Vessels, and the Taking of Biometrics, when
Appropriate Justification Exists
International agreements can be time-consuming, and are subject
to being watered down from their original intent. However, the
international community has passed a large number of anti-terrorism
treaties, often in the wake of terrorist attacks. 415 A provision on
boarding of vessels could be inserted into a new convention focusing
on terrorist travel and transport of weapons. While a more
comprehensive treaty on international terrorism would be ideal for
this, the contemplated Draft U.N. Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism 416 is likely to be too general in nature to
authorize a specific regime of shipboarding. However, all possible
treaties should be explored.
414. See supra note 366.
415. See UNODC, Conventions Against Terrorism,
http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (listing
thirteen international anti-terrorism treaties).
416. G.A. Draft Res. 60/L.12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/60/L.12 (Nov. 23, 2005).
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6. Conduct Non-Consensual Boardings and the Taking of
Biometrics as Consistent with Treaty and Customary Law
No article would be interesting to read without at least one
provocative thought for future authors to challenge-the Nike "Just
Do It" slogan comes to mind. As described more generally above,
customary international law is a key component of international law,
and it can develop over time without explicit state consent. Albeit
many argue, it cannot develop if there are persistent objections by
key states.417 Here, nations could "Just Do It". For example, the
United States could assist in expanding authorities by interpreting
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter more broadly to cover any ship
boarding designed to interdict all terrorists (not just Al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and their affiliates or supporters) in the War on Terror by
interdicting terrorists or seizing weapons. Similarly, a nation that
does not consider itself to be in a state of armed conflict (therefore
not relying on UNSCRs or Article 51 self-defense authority) could
also begin a regime of interdicting terrorists or WMD based on this
developing principle or custom of law.
The United States, or any other nation, could also broadly interpret
authorities under the ISPS to engage in boardings with the master's
consent, and to include the taking of biometrics. While developing
new customary international law in this manner will likely make
many scholars of international law cringe, nations may still argue
that they can block such actions from becoming customary
international law by persistently objecting. Such a custom, if
developed, would certainly assist in the interdiction of terrorists and
weapons that are being transported on the high seas, but may come at
too high a price for sovereign nations to agree to.
CONCLUSION
As the world becomes increasingly involved in non-traditional
armed conflict that is not waged by nation-states, but rather is carried
out by non-state actors who are terrorists and do not follow the laws
417. See Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in
International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (2005) (positing that,
with the exceptions of peremptory norms, "if a state persistently objects to the
development of a customary international law, it cannot be held to that law when
the custom ripens.").
670 [22:583
BRIDGING THE GAP
of war, traditional international laws may not be sufficient. In a
world where the rule of law is paramount, it is essential to seek legal
authorities for all justifiable acts, however, that leaves a conundrum.
What do you do when the law is not clear and there is a gap between
the laws that exist and the laws that are necessary? Does one wait for
the international community to negotiate an agreement or treaty, does
one begin to develop a custom of law, or does one simply do one's
best to take actions that follow the spirit, if not the letter, of the law
until something more clear develops?
The alternative is to follow the historic experience of the
international community by waiting until a truly tragic incident, in
this case, on the high seas, occurs to change and develop the laws
necessary to counter an emerging threat. While this article has
attempted to provide several lawful ways for the modern MIOs to be
carried out as necessary, there is an absence of clear authority in
certain instances. The United States and the world community have
an opportunity, and a responsibility, to utilize such operations to
close these gaps and prevent terrorism. As the world grows smaller
and closer through modern communications, technology, and
transportation, international law must be constantly be re-evaluated
to ensure that it keeps pace.
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